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RAS-401 systèmes Faculté des études systémiques et du nexus Ouvert

Complexité et réseaux

Comprendre le risque systémique par les rétroactions, l'interdépendance et la structure des réseaux

  • 4 labsHands-on labs inside the units: Network, Estate.
  • 4 graded checksModule checks that count toward your grade.
  • Open answerA written practicum, assessed against a rubric.
  • Completion recordA record that you passed the course. Not a licence.
  • ENLanguages this course runs in. English
  • Self-pacedStart any time and study at your own pace.
Notional hours
25.5
Modules
5
Résultats attendus
7
Niveau
L2Intermediate
Langues
1Anglais
Attestation
On pass
Open Module 1

Free to start, at your own pace.You enrol when you start. Your progress is saved on NXS Learning.

Vue d'ensemble

Learn how complex adaptive systems and networks shape systemic risk: read feedback loops, delays and tipping points, compute network measures by hand, trace cascades through interdependent infrastructure in network labs, and analyse a mapped port district to find critical nodes and compare where to act.

À qui il s'adresse

  • Disaster and climate risk practitioners who work across sectors.
  • Infrastructure, utility, supply chain and business continuity planners.
  • Public officials and analysts responsible for risk governance or resilience strategies.

Before you start

  • Familiarity with hazard, exposure and vulnerability, for example from a Risk Academy foundation course.
  • Comfort with simple arithmetic, fractions and reading tables. Every calculation is worked through step by step.

How you learn

  • Worked examples
  • Retrieval checks
  • Études de cas
  • Laboratoires
  • Open answer
  • Reflection

Syllabus

01 Complex systems and systemic riskOpen to everyoneThe properties of complex adaptive systems, from feedback and delays to tipping points, and why they make risk systemic. 3 lessons 2 h 50 min Vérifier
02 Network fundamentalsNodes, edges and measures; the main families of network structure; centrality and communities. 3 lessons 2 h 50 min Vérifier
  • Nodes, edges and measures 1 h 00 min
  • Topologies: random, small-world and scale-free 55 min
  • Centrality, bridges and communities 55 min
  • Module 2 check
03 Robustness, cascades and interdependenceWhy networks with hubs fail the way they do, how failures cascade across coupled systems, and where thresholds and percolation decide whether a shock stays local. 3 lessons 3 h 40 min Vérifier Laboratoire
  • Error and attack tolerance: hubs and targeted failure 1 h 10 min
  • Cascading failures and interdependent networks 1 h 15 min
  • Percolation, thresholds and the spread of contagion 1 h 15 min
  • Module 3 check
04 Mapping systems and choosing where to interveneTurning a messy system into a map, finding loops and leverage, and placing the result inside Nexus-Based Risk Management (NRM). 3 lessons 3 h 15 min Vérifier Laboratoire
  • Mapping a system: actors, dependencies and causal loops 1 h 10 min
  • Leverage points, trade-offs and risk governance 1 h 05 min
  • The Nexus lens: interconnected risk across sectors and scales 1 h 00 min
  • Module 4 check
05 PracticumAnalyse the Calder harbour district, a directed, weighted dependency map the course provides; find its critical nodes and loops, compare three candidate options inside the Nexus frame and choose methods to test the findings. 1 lesson 1 h 05 min
  • Practicum briefing: the Calder case, with a model analysis 1 h 05 min
  • Assignment: analyse the Calder dependency map

What you will be able to do

  • LO1Understand

    Explain how interdependence, feedback, delays, nonlinearity, emergence, tipping points and path dependence make risk systemic, using documented cases.

    Taught in module 1

  • LO2Appliquer

    Calculate and interpret degree, density, path length, clustering and betweenness for a small network described as an adjacency list.

    Taught in modules 2, 5

  • LO3Analyser

    Compare random, small-world and scale-free topologies and analyse their robustness to random failure and to targeted removal of hubs.

    Taught in modules 2, 3

  • LO4Analyser

    Analyse how failures cascade through interdependent networks using threshold rules, and identify critical nodes, convergence points and feedback loops in a mapped system.

    Taught in modules 2, 3, 4, 5

  • LO5Analyser

    Analyse interventions by their leverage point, cost and residual risk, and read the evidence on whether they work, naming the type of study behind it.

    Taught in modules 4, 5

  • LO6Analyser

    Analyse the directed, weighted dependency map of a case the course provides, re-run its cascades under candidate options, and choose methods to test how far the findings depend on uncertain weights.

    Taught in modules 4, 5

  • LO7Analyser

    Analyse how the risks in a mapped system interconnect across sectors and scales within Nexus-Based Risk Management (NRM), and place entity-level risk management inside that frame.

    Taught in modules 4, 5

Labs and tools

  • NetworkModule 3

    Find the most critical node in a city

    This illustrative city has 12 services.

  • NetworkModule 3

    Contain a cascade with a limited budget

    This illustrative port city has 14 services across energy, telecoms, water, health, transport, food and finance.

  • NetworkModule 3

    The bridge with two links

    Two districts of an illustrative city each have a hub service with four dependent services.

  • EstateModule 4

    Find the hidden dependency of a cascades room

    Open the explainer for the cascades room of the NXS-GRX system and find what connects it to the rest of the system.

Évaluation

Pass with 70%

  • Module 1 check10%
  • Module 2 check15%
  • Module 3 check15%
  • Module 4 check10%
  • System map practicum50%

Microcertification

Risk Academy

Attestation de réussite

Your name

Complexité et réseaux

RAS-40125.5 h notional

Pass the course to earn a completion record on NXS Learning.

Completing this course produces a completion record showing that you finished its lessons, labs, module checks and the system map practicum. It is a record of participation and assessed work, not proof of competence or a professional qualification.

How we know

The works this course draws on, listed in every unit's reading.

  • 57verified sources
  • 30articles
  • 13rapports
  • 6books
  • 5web pages
  • 1normes
  • 1articles
  • 1proceedings article
  1. UNDRR (2019). Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
  2. US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force (2004). Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations.
  3. Watts, D. J. and Strogatz, S. H. (1998). Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks. Nature, 393, 440-442.
All references (35)
  1. Barabási, A.-L. and Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 286, 509-512.
  2. Albert, R., Jeong, H. and Barabási, A.-L. (2000). Error and attack tolerance of complex networks. Nature, 406, 378-382.
  3. Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E. and Havlin, S. (2010). Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. Nature, 464, 1025-1028.
  4. Rinaldi, S. M., Peerenboom, J. P. and Kelly, T. K. (2001). Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 21(6), 11-25.
  5. Helbing, D. (2013). Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature, 497, 51-59.
  6. Meadows, D. (1999). Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System. Hartland, VT: The Sustainability Institute.
  7. Meadows, D. (2008). Thinking in Systems: A Primer. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green. ISBN 9781603581486.
  8. Scheffer, M., Carpenter, S., Foley, J. A., Folke, C. and Walker, B. (2001). Catastrophic shifts in ecosystems. Nature, 413, 591-596.
  9. Scheffer, M., Bascompte, J., Brock, W. A., et al. (2009). Early-warning signals for critical transitions. Nature, 461, 53-59.
  10. Arthur, W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. The Economic Journal, 99, 116-131.
  11. Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360-1380.
  12. Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 83(6), 1420-1443.
  13. Watts, D. J. (2002). A simple model of global cascades on random networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99(9), 5766-5771.
  14. Freeman, L. C. (1977). A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry, 40(1), 35-41.
  15. Zachary, W. W. (1977). An information flow model for conflict and fission in small groups. Journal of Anthropological Research, 33(4), 452-473.
  16. Newman, M. E. J. (2010). Networks: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199206650.
  17. Sterman, J. D. (1989). Modeling managerial behavior: misperceptions of feedback in a dynamic decision making experiment. Management Science, 35(3), 321-339.
  18. Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill. ISBN 9780071179898.
  19. Perrow, C. (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books.
  20. ISO (2018). ISO 31000:2018 Risk management: Guidelines. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.
  21. National Audit Office (2017). Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS. London: NAO.
  22. UCTE (2004). Final Report of the Investigation Committee on the 28 September 2003 Blackout in Italy. Brussels: Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity.
  23. FERC, NERC and Regional Entity Staff (2021). The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States. Washington, DC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
  24. David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review, 75(2), 332-337.
  25. Broido, A. D. and Clauset, A. (2019). Scale-free networks are rare. Nature Communications, 10, 1017.
  26. Cohen, R., Erez, K., ben-Avraham, D. and Havlin, S. (2000). Resilience of the Internet to random breakdowns. Physical Review Letters, 85, 4626-4628.
  27. Callaway, D. S., Newman, M. E. J., Strogatz, S. H. and Watts, D. J. (2000). Network robustness and fragility: percolation on random graphs. Physical Review Letters, 85, 5468-5471.
  28. Pastor-Satorras, R. and Vespignani, A. (2001). Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks. Physical Review Letters, 86, 3200-3203.
  29. Newman, M. E. J. and Girvan, M. (2004). Finding and evaluating community structure in networks. Physical Review E, 69, 026113.
  30. Borio, C. (2003). Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation? BIS Working Paper 128. Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
  31. Kishore, N., Marqués, D., Mahmud, A., et al. (2018). Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. New England Journal of Medicine, 379(2), 162-170.
  32. Booysen, M. J., Visser, M. and Burger, R. (2019). Temporal case study of household behavioural response to Cape Town's "Day Zero" using smart meter data. Water Research, 149, 414-420.
RAS-401

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Preview syllabus

  1. 01Complex systems and systemic risk3 lessons · 2 h 50 minLO1
  2. 02Network fundamentals3 lessons · 2 h 50 minLO2 LO3 LO4
  3. 03Robustness, cascades and interdependence3 lessons · 3 h 40 minLO3 LO4
  4. 04Mapping systems and choosing where to intervene3 lessons · 3 h 15 minLO4 LO5 LO6 LO7
  5. 05Practicum1 lesson · 1 h 05 minLO2 LO4 LO5 LO6 LO7