Risk Academy, led by the Nexus Consortium · Infrastructure, Energy and Industry · Department of Cities and Infrastructure Systems
Taught in the Systems stream
Betroubaarheids-, veiligheids- en veerkragtigheidsingenieurswese
Reliability and resilience engineering studies how engineered systems fail and how they are designed, tested and maintained to keep working or to recover quickly.
Illustrative: a truss under a moving load with members coloured by stress, a lattice tower swaying, or a geodesic dome
01Omvang
What the discipline covers
The subtopics its courses and labs teach.
- Reliability analysis and failure rates
- Fault tree and event tree analysis
- Failure modes and effects analysis
- Safety cases and safety integrity
- Design for graceful degradation
- Redundancy, diversity and recovery
- Asset management and ageing infrastructure
- Inspection, maintenance and monitoring
02Kaarte
Maps and the globe for any place
Search any place or open the world; the layers and generators follow reliability, safety and resilience engineering on the planet map, the globe and in 3D.
The boundaries, names and designations shown do not imply any judgement on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Countries: Natural Earth (public domain).
03The subject
The subject, methods and measures and debates and bodies
The discipline
The field and its scope
For reliability, safety and asset engineers, safety case authors and regulators who need to quantify failure rates, build fault and event trees, set safety integrity targets and plan inspection and maintenance of ageing assets.
Reliability, safety and resilience engineering studies how engineered systems fail, how often, with what consequences, and how design, testing, inspection and maintenance keep them working or bring them back. It covers the probabilistic treatment of component failure, the logic of fault and event trees that connect component failures to system outcomes, the safety case that argues a system is acceptably safe, and the design of degradation and recovery so that failures are graceful rather than abrupt. The field serves equipment designers, operators of process plants, grids, railways and aircraft, asset owners with ageing fleets, and the regulators who set tolerable risk.
The discipline grew from military reliability programmes of the 1950s, from the nuclear probabilistic risk assessment of WASH-1400 in 1975, and from the process safety reforms that followed Flixborough, Seveso and Piper Alpha. Its standards layer now runs through IEC 61508 for functional safety and its sector derivatives, IEC 31010 for risk assessment techniques, ISO 55000 for asset management, revised in 2024, and the system-theoretic methods of Leveson that treat accidents as control problems. Resilience engineering, after Hollnagel and Woods, adds the study of how operators adapt to keep systems within safe bounds, which classical reliability analysis does not model.
Measures
Quantities and units
| Quantity | Unit or scale | What to know |
|---|---|---|
| Failure rate (lambda) | failures per hour, often expressed as FIT (failures per billion hours) | Assumes a constant hazard rate in the useful-life phase of the bathtub curve. Rates from handbooks such as MIL-HDBK-217 or OREDA carry factors of two to ten in uncertainty between environments and vintages. |
| Mean time between failures and mean time to repair | hours | Summaries of the failure and repair distributions; availability follows as MTBF divided by MTBF plus MTTR. The means hide the distribution shape, and repair times depend on spares and crews rather than on the component. |
| Probability of failure on demand (PFD) | dimensionless probability, banded as safety integrity levels 1 to 4 in IEC 61508 | Average probability that a safety function fails when called. Computed from failure rates, proof-test intervals and diagnostic coverage; the result is sensitive to common-cause factors that are estimated by judgement. |
| Top-event frequency from a fault tree | events per year | Carries the propagated uncertainty of all basic events, which analysts seldom report; the minimal cut sets that dominate the result say more about where to act than the point estimate does. |
| Remaining useful life | hours, cycles or years, with a prediction interval | Output of prognostics models from condition monitoring. Intervals widen quickly beyond the data range, and models trained on run-to-failure test data are optimistic in service. |
| Resilience triangle metrics | percentage functionality lost and hours to recover | The depth and duration of performance loss after a disturbance. Definitions of functionality and of full recovery vary by study, so values are comparable only within one study. |
Metodes
Methods and their limits
Each method is listed with what it assumes and where it fails.
| Metode | Assumes | Fails when |
|---|---|---|
| Fault tree analysis | That the system failure can be decomposed into a Boolean logic of independent basic events with known probabilities. | When common-cause failures violate independence, when the tree omits human and software failure modes, and when the logic is static while the system has sequence-dependent behaviour. |
| Event tree analysis | That the response to an initiating event unfolds through an ordered set of safety functions, each succeeding or failing with a known probability. | When the order of events is not fixed, when functions share dependencies, and when the initiating event set is incomplete. |
| Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) | That each component's failure modes and their local and system effects can be enumerated and ranked by severity, occurrence and detection. | When interactions between simultaneous failures matter, when risk priority numbers multiply ordinal scales as if they were ratios, and when the analysis is done once and never updated. |
| Functional safety lifecycle under IEC 61508 | That hazards can be identified, risk reduction allocated to safety functions, and target integrity levels verified by design and proof testing. | When systematic failures, especially in software, dominate and are not captured by random hardware failure rates, and when the safety case becomes documentation rather than argument. |
| System-theoretic process analysis (STPA) | That accidents result from inadequate control and that unsafe control actions can be found from a control structure without needing failure probabilities. | When the control structure model is wrong or too coarse, and when the method's qualitative output must be compared with quantitative targets. |
| Condition monitoring and prognostics | That degradation leaves a measurable signature, vibration, temperature, oil debris or strain, that precedes failure by a usable lead time. | When failure modes are sudden, when sensors degrade faster than the asset, and when alarms are so frequent that they are ignored. |
Debates
What the field debates
- Are probabilistic risk assessments credible for rare, high-consequence events?
- Supporters cite nuclear and aerospace programmes where PRA found dominant cut sets that design reviews missed, and the long accident-free record of plants that act on PRA findings. Critics, including the authors of post-Fukushima reviews, note that external hazards, common-cause failures and organisational factors were underweighted in the assessments that preceded major accidents, and that reported frequencies of once in a million years cannot be validated.
- Redundancy and diversity versus simplicity?
- Redundant and diverse channels reduce the probability that a single fault defeats a safety function, which the PFD arithmetic of IEC 61508 rewards. The opposing evidence is that added channels add complexity, spurious trips and hidden common-cause couplings, as in cases where a shared power supply or a shared software version defeated the redundancy, so simpler designs with fewer things to fail can be safer.
- Should ageing assets be managed by condition or by age?
- Condition-based maintenance is supported by evidence that most failure modes do not follow age, from the airline studies behind reliability-centred maintenance onward, and by falling sensor costs. Age-based replacement remains defended where degradation is hidden, where inspection is itself hazardous, and where the cost of a missed failure is catastrophic, as with pressure vessels and pipelines.
Bodies and data
Bodies that set practice, and the data they publish
Bodies and standards are named so learners can find and apply their published work; the Academy teaches their use and links to the publisher, and no affiliation is implied.
| Body | Role in the field |
|---|---|
| IEC Technical Committee 56 Dependability | Publishes the dependability standards including IEC 60300, IEC 61025 on fault tree analysis and IEC 60812 on failure modes and effects analysis. |
| IEC Technical Committee 65 and the IEC 61508 maintenance team | Stewards IEC 61508 on functional safety of electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems and its sector standards such as IEC 61511. |
| ISO/TC 251 Asset management | Publishes the ISO 55000 series on asset management, revised in 2024. |
| ISO/TC 262 and IEC TC 56 jointly | Maintain IEC 31010, the catalogue of risk assessment techniques used across sectors. |
| United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) | Sets probabilistic risk assessment practice for nuclear plants and publishes the regulatory guides that other high-hazard sectors borrow. |
| Resilience Engineering Association | The scholarly community that develops resilience engineering theory and methods such as the functional resonance analysis method. |
| Dataset | Steward |
|---|---|
| OREDA Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data | OREDA participants, published by DNV |
| NASA Prognostics Center of Excellence Data Repository | NASA Ames Research Center |
| Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS) | European Commission Joint Research Centre |
| Chemical Safety Board investigation reports | United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board |
04Die metode
From a failure rate to a safety integrity level: how often a protection fails on demand
A component's failure rate and the share of its failures that stay hidden set how often a safety function is silently broken; the proof-test interval sets how long it stays broken; together they give the probability of failure on demand, the quantity that places the function in a safety integrity band.
Sources: Rausand, Barros and Hoyland, System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Methods, and Applications (2020); IEC 61508-1:2010, Functional safety of electrical, electronic and programmable electronic safety-related systems (2010); Leveson, Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied to Safety (2012); Zio, Reliability engineering: old problems and new challenges (2009).
05Instrument
Betroubaarheids-, veiligheids- en veerkragtigheidsingenieurswese
- 0Maak oop
- 1In preparation
- 6Also taught here
- 8Subtopics
- Kursusse
- In preparation
- Vlakke
- L3 Advanced
- Laboratoriums
- Network lab, Map lab, Exposure lab
Risk Academy · Infrastructure, Energy and Industry
3D-grafiek
Fakulteit vir Infrastruktuur, Energie en Nywerheid
197 nodes1,275 relations9 views
Course codes from the curriculum; study levels L1 to L4.
06Standards and evidence
Standards and evidence, research and evidence, profile, what is changing and learning
Nexus Standards
Nexus Standards it teaches and relies on
The Nexus Standards the discipline teaches toward, grouped by master standard, with the disciplines that teach each.
nexustandards.com/energy-infrastructure · 2 taught
Energie en kritieke infrastruktuur
NRS-H92 Ageing and degraded infrastructure; NRS-N6 Infrastructure risk and resilience
2 standards1 discipline
nexustandards.com/hazards · 2 taught
Gevare en rampristkovermindering
NRS-C14 Resilience capability and maturity; NRS-M4 Vulnerability, fragility and resilience
2 standards1 discipline
Nexus Standards at the AcademyThe Academy proposes how each discipline teaches toward the Nexus Standards; the mapping is open for public review.
Hub
Research and tools
Research and preprints as they are published, by discipline, with the faculty's other tools.
The hub lists the newest research and preprints for Reliability, safety and resilience engineering, each with its source and date. Open the research hub
Metodes en standaarde
Methods, frameworks and hazards
From the Academy's risk taxonomy: the discipline's own entries and those of its primary courses, with how many courses teach each.
Methods and practice
- Network and systems analysis1 course
Hazard families
- Critical infrastructure outage1 course
Wat nou verander
Wat nou verander
Recent developments in reliability, safety and resilience engineering, each with its source; sources checked on 16 October 2026.
Report
Single loose wire caused blackouts before Key Bridge collapse
The NTSB found that a loose signal wire, poorly seated because of wire-label banding, opened a breaker on the containership Dali, causing two blackouts and loss of propulsion and steering before it struck and collapsed Baltimore's Key Bridge, killing six.
Why it matters. A minor installation defect defeated a large system; it reinforces attention to single points of failure, installation quality and recovery time in safety-critical design.
Source: National Transportation Safety Board, Loose Wire on Containership Dali Leads to Blackouts and Contact with Baltimore's Francis Scott Key Bridge, 18 November 2025.
Kursusse
Courses in this discipline
Courses for this discipline are in development; until they open, study it through the connected courses and open lessons below.
Courses with this primary discipline
In preparation
- RAS-407Critical Infrastructure Interdependency and Resilience EngineeringSystems, L3 Advanced, 12 hours (estimate)In preparation
Also taught here
Courses from connected disciplines that also teach this field
Each course has its primary discipline elsewhere and teaches this field as part of its scope.
From connected disciplines
1 course open
- RAF-102Resilience Building 101Foundation, L1 Introductory, 19.5 hours, primary discipline: Community resilience and inclusionOpen for enrolment
- RAF-113Business Continuity and Organisational ResilienceFoundation, L1 Introductory, 8 hours (estimate), primary discipline: Operational risk and business continuityIn preparation
- RAN-316Health Care Risk and Hospital ResilienceNexus, L2 Intermediate, 10 hours (estimate), primary discipline: Health systems and health care resilienceIn preparation
- RAN-318Telecommunications ResilienceNexus, L2 Intermediate, 8 hours (estimate), primary discipline: Critical infrastructure and lifelinesIn preparation
- RAN-321Water and Wastewater Utility RiskNexus, L2 Intermediate, 10 hours (estimate), primary discipline: Water security and hydrologyIn preparation
- RAS-414Measuring Resilience: Indicators and EvaluationSystems, L2 Intermediate, 8 hours (estimate), primary discipline: Community resilience and inclusionIn preparation
Laboratoriums
How the subject is practised in labs
| Lab | What you do in it | Courses using it |
|---|---|---|
| Network lab | Build dependency graphs, find critical nodes, trace cascades | 4 |
| Map lab | Read hazard, exposure and boundaries on real maps | 3 |
| Exposure lab | Overlay people and assets with hazard footprints | 3 |
07Konsole
How Reliability, safety and resilience engineering is taught, as a process you can run
Press Play to run this process from this page's own data.
Betroubaarheids-, veiligheids- en veerkragtigheidsingenieurswese
How Reliability, safety and resilience engineering is taught
5 subjects in scope, 3 key terms, courses in development, 3 labs, in the Cities and Infrastructure Systems department of Infrastructure, Energy and Industry: from the scope to the method and its terms, the courses that teach it, the labs on the twin, the assessment and the record.
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01 Scope
- 01
Reliability analysis…
Start · the discipline
Reliability analysis and failure rates
- 02
Fault tree and event…
Start · the discipline
Fault tree and event tree analysis
- 03
Failure modes and…
Start · the discipline
Failure modes and effects analysis
- 04
Safety cases and safety…
Start · the discipline
Safety cases and safety integrity
- 05
Design for graceful…
Start · the discipline
Design for graceful degradation
- 01
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02 Method and terms
- 08
From a failure rate to…
Model · the learner
A component's failure rate and the share of its failures that stay hidden set how often a safety function is silently broken; the…
- 09
Reliability
Record · the discipline
The probability that a system performs its required function under stated conditions for a stated period.
- 11
Fault tree
Record · the discipline
A diagram that traces how combinations of component failures lead to a defined top event.
- 13
Failure modes and…
Record · the discipline
A structured review of how each component can fail and what follows from each failure.
- 08
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03 Courses
- 10
RAS-407 Critical…
Record · the learner
Critical Infrastructure Interdependency and Resilience Engineering
- 10
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04 Labs
- 06
Kaart
Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin
The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.
- 07
Blootstelling
Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin
The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.
- 12
Netwerk
Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin
The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.
- 06
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05 Assess
- 14
Module checks
Gate · the course
Each module ends with a short check against its outcomes.
- 15
Assessed work
Decision · the learner
The assessed work that closes a course: a lab record, a case memo or an assignment, reviewed against the rubric.
- 14
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06 Record
- 16
Voltooiingsrekord
Outcome · the learner
The record stacks into the discipline achievement.
- 17
Discipline achievement
Record · the Academy
The discipline achievement follows the discipline rule, read from the records.
- 16
Reliability, safety and resilience engineering · Cities and Infrastructure Systems An outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.
08Praktyk
Practice, learning and connections
Technology in this area
How technology helps and what risk it brings
| Aspect | In this area |
|---|---|
| Technology that helps | Digital twins, sensors and robotics for inspection. |
| Risk technology creates | Cascading cyber-physical failure and vendor lock-in. |
- RAT-263 Digital Twins for Risk: Design, Validation and Limits In development
- RAT-261 OT/ICS and Critical Infrastructure Cyber Resilience In development
- RAS-407 Critical Infrastructure Interdependency and Resilience Engineering In preparation
Prestasies
Achievements in this discipline
Course achievements
One for each course with this as its primary discipline, earned when you pass the course's assessed activities.
Discipline: Reliability, safety and resilience engineering
Complete 3 assessed courses in reliability, safety and resilience engineering, at least 2 with it as their primary discipline and at least 1 at Intermediate (L2) or above, totalling at least 45 measured learning hours. In development.
Department: Cities and Infrastructure Systems
Earn two discipline achievements in the Department of Cities and Infrastructure Systems. In development.
Programme: Nexus-Based Risk Management flagship pathway
Complete every core course of the Nexus-Based Risk Management flagship pathway under assessed completion, ending with its capstone. In development.
An achievement is a record of the learning completed and assessed here. How recognition works.
Leerpaaie
Pathways that teach it
- Nexus-Based Risk Management flagship pathwayAcademy flagshipOne of its 20 courses is in this discipline.
- Infrastructure resilience engineerRole pathway3 of its 10 courses are in this discipline.
- Disaster risk reduction practitionerRole pathwayOne of its 12 courses is in this discipline.
- Enterprise risk managerRole pathwayOne of its 12 courses is in this discipline.
- Public health emergency plannerRole pathwayOne of its 8 courses is in this discipline.
Where this is practised
Where the subject is practised
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Systemic Risk ManagementResilience engineering
Field platforms of the ecosystem where the subject is studied and applied.
Practised in
The three Foundry systems where it is practised
- FoundryNXS-LAB systemReliability tests as reproducible experiments
- NXS-APP systemDiagnosis and restoration after failure
- NXS-GRX systemFailure propagation in coupled systems
Foundry system pages describe what each system and its rooms are designed to do; the courses teach the methods these systems apply.
Across the ecosystem
Across the ecosystem
The science, platforms and standards this discipline draws on and contributes to across the ecosystem.
Foundations in the STEM Commons
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Reliability and resilience engineeringReliability and resilience engineering studies how systems fail, how failures can be prevented and how systems absorb, adapt and recover from disruption.
- Software and safety-critical systems engineeringSoftware and safety-critical systems engineering develops software whose failure could cause harm, loss of life or major disruption.
- Probability and statisticsProbability and statistics provide the mathematical framework for describing uncertainty and learning from data.
- Systems engineeringSystems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach to designing and managing complex systems over their life cycle.
Standards for the field
- Nexus StandardsEnergy and Critical InfrastructureThe subsite that keeps the standards this discipline teaches.
- Hazards and Disaster Risk ReductionThe subsite that keeps the standards this discipline teaches.
Pages of the ecosystem, cited so learners can follow the field into research, platforms, standards and national practice.
09Neem deel
Take part in Infrastructure, Energy and Industry
Begin by wie u is.
Roetes
Roete
Nasionale instellings
Ministeries, statistiekkantore en agentskappe: 'n nasionale lessenaar en tak, en 'n setel in die werkgroepe. Nasionale hoofstukke
Roete
Sektore en beroepe
Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches infrastructure, energy and industry. For organisations
Roete
Leer
Kursusse en praktyk, met 'n rekord van elke voltooide kursus. Gratis om te studeer. Oop leer
Roete
Standaarde
Stel die metodes en datastandaarde saam met die werkgroepe op, hersien en aanvaar dit. Werkgroepe
Roete
Gemeenskappe en navorsing
Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the Academy
Oop oproepe
| Oop oproep | Soek | Sluit |
|---|---|---|
| Stigtingsoproep vir kundiges vir die werkgroepe CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTS | kundige, redakteur, voorsitter | 2026-12-15 |
| Oop nominasie vir die drie onafhanklike kundigesetels van die Wêreldwye Standaarderaad CALL-GSC-IND | raadslid | 2026-12-01 |
| Nominasies van tussentydse streekslede (geld slegs as daar oor die oorgangsbepaling besluit word) CALL-GSC-REG | raadslid | 2026-12-15 |
| Hersiening van die uiteensettings van die golf-1-risikokern (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1 | bydraer | 2027-01-31 |
| Kundiges vir die kernstandaarde van risikowetenskap: onsekerheid en gradering van bewyse, skale, gestruktureerde kundige oordeel, aanvaarbaarheid, uiterstes en saamgestelde gebeure, katastrofiese en eksistensiële risiko, etiek en billikheid, eenhede en meting (NRS-C17 tot NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCE | kundige, redakteur, voorsitter | 2027-01-31 |
| Onafhanklike beoordelaars vir die families van die gevaar-atlas, drie uit minstens twee streke vir elke familie (NHS2-R19), prioriteitsfamilies eerste CALL-ATLAS-REVIEW | kundige | 2027-03-31 |
| Lede van die tussentydse Frontier Safety Review Panel en rooispanbeoordelaars (biologiese veiligheid en biosekuriteit, KI-veiligheid en -sekuriteit, sekuriteit van kritieke infrastruktuur); aansoeke word vertroulik hanteer CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEW | kundige | 2026-11-30 |
| Kundiges in ontologie, metrologie, sagtewareverifikasie en konformiteitsbeoordeling vir die vereisteregister, die NHS-2-masjienvoorstelling, die konformiteitstoetsreekse en die konformiteitsbeoordelingskema CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGY | kundige, redakteur | 2027-01-31 |
Oproepe ná hul sluitingsdatum word outomaties versteek. Elke oproep, voorstel en roete: oop gebiede en oproepe.
Selle en CERT's
Bring die sel bymekaar
Bring drie tot sewe mense met aanvullende vaardighede bymekaar: data, veldpraktyk, beleid en kommunikasie.
Registreer dit
Write to the team with the cell's name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the Academy
Kies 'n handves
Kies een fokus: navorsing en bewyse, data en kaarte, hersiening van standaarde, of gemeenskapsgereedheid.
Leer saam
Volg gedeelde studiepaaie by Risk Academy, met praktyk en 'n rekord van elke voltooide kursus. Gevare en veerkragtigheid
Lei en rapporteer
Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups
Spesialiseer as 'n Gemeenskapsnoodreaksiespan (CERT)
A CERT prepares its neighbourhood for the hazards it faces. It builds a local hazard profile from this site's map. It trains in household and street preparedness. It learns first aid and light search through recognised local providers, and it runs drills. A CERT works alongside the local emergency services and follows their direction. It never replaces them and is not an emergency service.
Die Indeks
Wat 'n nasionale span of 'n plaaslike gemeenskap vandag op The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) kan doen.
NXS-GRX
Your country's profile
Oop risikoprofiele vir 195 lande, met bronne en lisensies by elke waarde. Open die Indeks
NXS-GRX
Korrigeer of antwoord
Korrigeer 'n waarde of antwoord namens jou land. Die verandering word met sy effek aangeteken. Open die Indeks
NXS-GRX
Bied data aan
Bied 'n datastel aan. Dit kom deur die lisensiehek in, met erkenning aan jou. Open die Indeks
NXS-GRX
Gebruik die oop data
Lae, profiele en teëls deur die oop API. Open die Indeks
10References
Core references and where to begin
Start with Rausand, then Zio, then Apostolakis.
- Rausand, M., Barros, A. and Høyland, A., System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Methods, and Applications (2020). DOI
- Leveson, N. G., Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied to Safety (2012). DOI
- Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. and Leveson, N. (eds), Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts (2006). DOI
- Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (1999). DOI
- Reason, J., Human Error (1990). DOI
- Zio, E., Reliability engineering: old problems and new challenges (2009). DOI
- Jardine, A. K. S., Lin, D. and Banjevic, D., A review on machinery diagnostics and prognostics implementing condition-based maintenance (2006). DOI
- Apostolakis, G. E., How useful is quantitative risk assessment? (2004). DOI
- Woods, D. D., Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience engineering (2015). DOI
11Vrae
Vrae, antwoorde en kernterme
Is studie hier gratis?
Ja. Elke kursus en leermateriaal van Risk Academy, gelei deur die Nexus Consortium, is gratis om te studeer, op eie tempo of saam met 'n groep. Gewone deelname het geen fooi nie; betaalde werk, internskappe en genootskappe is afsonderlike reëlings.
Wat gee die voltooiing van 'n kursus my?
'n Voltooiingsrekord: die kursus, sy weergawe, die datum en wat geassesseer is, by verstek privaat en deur u gedeel. Dit stapel op tot dissipline-, departements- en programprestasies. 'n Rekord meld wat bestudeer en geassesseer is en sertifiseer nie bevoegdheid nie; dit is nie 'n lisensie, 'n professionele titel of 'n indiensnemingstatus nie.
Waar kom die data en die plekke vandaan?
Elke fakulteit onderrig op 'n tweeling van 'n werklike plek wat uit oop data gebou is; elke laag dra sy verskaffer, lisensie en datum, en elke resultaat op die Akademie vermeld sy bron. Kaarte en figure is aanwysers vir onderrig, nooit 'n assessering van 'n plek nie.
How do I take part beyond the courses in reliability, safety and resilience engineering?
Vorm 'n bevoegdheidsel van drie tot sewe mense, bestudeer 'n gedeelde roete, neem 'n opdrag onder toesig in die Nasionale Werkgroepe, of bring 'n groep van jou instelling. Vir organisasies.
Kernterme
- Reliability
- The probability that a system performs its required function under stated conditions for a stated period.
- Fault tree
- A diagram that traces how combinations of component failures lead to a defined top event.
- Failure modes and effects analysis
- A structured review of how each component can fail and what follows from each failure.
- Safety case
- A structured argument, supported by evidence, that a system is acceptably safe for a given use.
VerslaeDra by
Dra bewyse vanaf hierdie bladsy by.
Reports is die Konsortium se kwartaallikse publikasie. Wat jy oor hierdie onderwerp weet, kan in die volgende uitgawe bewyse, 'n gevallestudie of 'n regstelling word, aan jou toegeskryf en gepubliseer onder CC BY 4.0 waar dit jou eie werk is.
Risk Academy
- EmailGateway GW-ACADEMY Send it from this page Evidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen deposit Deposit it and submit to the community Publish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsRisk Academy See every way to contribute The contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Stuur nooit persoonlike data, sensitiewe infrastruktuurbesonderhede of enigiets wat u geen reg het om te deel nie. 'n Bydrae word voor gebruik beoordeel; die stuur daarvan verleen geen outeurskap of redaksionele regte nie, en borgskap koop nooit 'n bevinding nie.
Betroubaarheids-, veiligheids- en veerkragtigheidsingenieurswese
Start with an open course
The catalogue lists each course with its outcomes, labs, hours and level.
Open RAF-102Back to Department of Cities and Infrastructure Systems