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Risk Academy, led by the Nexus Consortium · Technology and Digital Systems · Department of Cyber, Digital and Space Systems

Satellite positioning and timing, the threats to them and the backups

સ્થાન નિર્ધારણ, નેવિગેશન અને સમય સ્થિતિસ્થાપકતા

Phone networks, power grids, payment systems and aircraft all take position or time from satellites, often without their operators knowing how much.

Map positioning, navigation and timing resilience on a real placeSee the courses

Illustrative: satellite orbits, their ground swaths or the lines of sight a receiver keeps

01વ્યાપ

What the discipline covers

The subtopics its courses and labs teach.

અભ્યાસક્રમો
In preparation
સ્તરો
In development
પ્રયોગશાળાઓ
In development
  • GNSS systems and signals
  • Timing for telecommunications, power and finance
  • Jamming and spoofing
  • Space weather effects on GNSS
  • Interference detection and monitoring
  • Backup PNT: eLoran, fibre timing, inertial and signals of opportunity
  • Resilient receivers and holdover clocks
  • Aviation and maritime GNSS interference
  • PNT resilience policy and standards

02નકશા

Build a twin of any place

Search any place or open the world; the layers and generators follow positioning, navigation and timing resilience on the planet map, the globe and in 3D.

West Cornwall: Goonhilly and the Porthcurno cable landings: a flat plan of the faculty twin. Terrain 0 to 245 m; 4 satellite dishes; 74 communication masts and towers; 12 telephone exchanges; 7 data centres and cable landing stations; 12 aerodromes; 1 telecom offices; Communication line 161 km; 729 known exploited vulnerabilities since 2023-10-17; Night-time lights, VIIRS day-night band: read live when the 3D twin opens. Contours every 25 metres from the elevation grid; communication cables by class; ground infrastructure as marks.
West Cornwall: Goonhilly and the Porthcurno cable landings, United Kingdom. Flat plan of the same data: relief as contours from the inline grid, the mapped ground infrastructure by kind, the mapped cables and the numbers below. The 3D twin opens on devices that can draw it, once its data and code have been checked.
  • Terrain 0 to 245 m
  • 4 satellite dishes
  • 74 communication masts and towers
  • 12 telephone exchanges
  • 7 data centres and cable landing stations
  • 12 aerodromes
  • 1 telecom offices
  • Communication line 161 km
  • 729 known exploited vulnerabilities since 2023-10-17
  • Night-time lights, VIIRS day-night band: read live when the 3D twin opens
Credits and dates per layer are listed under the stage. Relief in the twin is exaggerated ×1.5 for legibility.

Drag to move, right drag or Shift with a drag to turn and tilt, Ctrl with the wheel to zoom. Keyboard: arrows move, Shift with arrows turn and tilt, + and – zoom, 0 resets, V steps through the views, Escape clears.

Flat plan of the same data: relief as contours from the inline grid, the mapped ground infrastructure by kind, the mapped cables and the numbers below. The 3D twin opens on devices that can draw it, once its data and code have been checked.

The boundaries, names and designations shown do not imply any judgement on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Countries: Natural Earth (public domain).

03The subject

The subject, methods and measures and debates and bodies

The discipline

The field and its scope

For telecommunications, energy, finance and transport operators, receiver engineers and policy staff who must know how their services depend on satellite timing and positioning and how to keep running without it.

Positioning, navigation and timing resilience studies the dependence of critical services on global navigation satellite systems (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou and regional systems) and the means of keeping those services running when the signals are jammed, spoofed, degraded by space weather or simply unavailable. The dependence is wider than navigation: mobile networks synchronise base stations to GNSS time, power grids time-stamp phasor measurements with it, financial venues stamp trades with it under regulatory clock rules, and data centres and broadcast networks discipline their clocks from it. The signal arrives at the receiver at a power near 10 to the minus 16 watts, so a small transmitter can deny it over kilometres and a modest one can forge it.

The field is organised among the system providers and their civil service interfaces, national authorities that have begun to treat PNT as critical infrastructure, receiver and clock manufacturers, standards bodies for timing in telecommunications and finance, and the operators who must specify holdover, backup and monitoring. Interference has become routine in several regions since 2022, with aviation and maritime reports in the thousands per month, which moved the subject from contingency planning to daily operations.

Measures

Quantities and units

QuantityUnit or scaleWhat to know
Position and timing accuracymetres (95 percent horizontal); nanoseconds of time error against UTCCivil GPS performance standards specify a signal-in-space user range error, with typical user position accuracy of a few metres and timing within tens of nanoseconds; actual error depends on the receiver, multipath, ionosphere and augmentation, and the figure is meaningless without its percentile.
Holdover performancemicroseconds of accumulated time error over a stated period without GNSSAn oven-controlled crystal oscillator holds a few microseconds for hours; a rubidium clock holds about a microsecond for a day; caesium holds it for weeks. Telecommunications timing requirements (ITU-T G.8272 for primary reference time clocks, 100 nanoseconds) and the 1.5 microsecond budget common to mobile networks fix how long a site can run on holdover.
Interference occurrencecount of flights or voyages reporting jamming or spoofing per month; percent of flights affected in a regionDerived from aircraft navigation-integrity broadcasts and crew reports; regional rates in the Baltic, Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean reached thousands of flights per month in 2024. Counts depend on reporting routes and on the aircraft types that broadcast integrity data.
Protection level and integrity riskmetres of an assured error bound; probability of hazardously misleading information per operation (for example 10 to the minus 7 per approach)Integrity figures are computed by augmentation systems (SBAS, GBAS) under stated fault models; they do not cover spoofing, which defeats the assumption of independent satellite faults.
Jamming-to-signal ratio tolerateddecibelsA receiver's resistance to interference, raised by adaptive antennas and signal processing; laboratory figures assume a single interferer at a known angle.
Economic loss from GNSS disruptioncurrency per day of outage, by sectorA United Kingdom study estimated about 1 billion pounds per day for a five-day outage (London Economics, 2017) and a United States study estimated about 1 billion dollars per day (RTI, 2019); both are scenario models with wide ranges and exclude cascading effects beyond the sectors modelled.

પદ્ધતિઓ

Methods and their limits

Each method is listed with what it assumes and where it fails.

પદ્ધતિAssumesFails when
Dependency audit of timing and positioning across an organisationEvery system that takes GNSS time or position, directly or through a network time source, can be found and its tolerance to loss stated.When the dependency sits in vendor equipment or in a network time protocol chain nobody traced back to a GNSS antenna, and when tolerances are unknown because the system has never been run without the signal.
Interference detection and monitoring (automatic gain control, carrier-to-noise anomalies, consistency checks, crowdsourced and aircraft-derived maps)Jamming and spoofing leave signatures in receiver observables that a monitoring network can detect and localise.Against low-power and well-aligned spoofing that mimics the expected signal, when the monitoring network is sparse, and because aircraft-derived maps show where aircraft fly, not where interference is.
Spoofing detection on the receiver (signal-quality monitoring, multi-constellation and multi-frequency consistency, authenticated signals such as Galileo OSNMA, inertial cross-checks)A forged signal differs from the true one in a way the receiver can test, or carries no valid authentication.When the receiver predates the technique, when the attacker records and replays authentic signals, and because authentication proves origin, not that the signal was not delayed or jammed.
Holdover clocks and timing architecture (ITU-T G.8272 and G.8275 profiles, Precision Time Protocol distribution)A site or network can bridge GNSS loss with local oscillators disciplined before the loss, and distribute time over the network within budget.When the loss outlasts the holdover specification, when the holdover figure was measured at constant temperature, and when the network path asymmetry exceeds the budget.
Complementary PNT (eLoran, terrestrial beacons, fibre-delivered time, inertial navigation, signals of opportunity)A dissimilar source with different failure modes can take over within the required accuracy for the required duration.Where no terrestrial service exists (eLoran has been switched off in several regions and rebuilt in others), where inertial drift exceeds the accuracy need within minutes, and when the complementary source shares a failure mode (a fibre timing feed itself disciplined by GNSS).
Resilient receiver and system conformance frameworksReceivers can be tested against defined interference and spoofing scenarios and classified by how they respond and recover.When the test scenarios lag attacker techniques, when the classified behaviour is not the behaviour integrated into the larger system, and when procurement does not demand the higher classes.

Debates

What the field debates

Should states fund a national terrestrial backup such as eLoran, or rely on diversified receivers and market solutions?
Advocates of a public terrestrial system cite the scenario cost estimates of GNSS loss, the shared failure modes of all satellite systems in a severe space weather event, and the low marginal cost of eLoran against those losses. Opponents cite low uptake of the earlier Loran-C service, the need for new user equipment across sectors, and the view that multi-constellation, authenticated and inertially aided receivers plus fibre timing already give sufficient diversity. The evidence is cost-benefit modelling with contested assumptions.
Does public mapping of jamming and spoofing help operators more than it helps the perpetrators?
Those publishing maps argue that crews and operators need current awareness and that publication adds little to what those operating interference sources already know. Those urging restraint argue that detailed maps help attackers calibrate and that unverified crowdsourced reports mislead. Current practice publishes aggregated aviation-derived maps while withholding localisation detail.
Where should regulators set clock accuracy requirements for finance and telecommunications?
Tighter requirements (100 microseconds for high-frequency trading under European rules, nanosecond-level for some mobile network features) improve traceability and interoperability but increase dependence on GNSS, since few other sources meet them. Looser requirements reduce dependence at the cost of ordering ambiguity in trades and of network capacity.

Bodies and data

Bodies that set practice, and the data they publish

Bodies and standards are named so learners can find and apply their published work; the Academy teaches their use and links to the publisher, and no affiliation is implied.

BodyRole in the field
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)Sets standards for GNSS use in aviation, integrity requirements and interference reporting, and has issued guidance on GNSS interference.
International Maritime Organization (IMO)Sets performance standards for shipborne receivers and multi-system radionavigation and issued guidance on GNSS interference for ships.
International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T Study Group 15 and ITU-R)Recommendations on network timing (G.8272, G.8275) and on protection of the radionavigation satellite service spectrum.
United States Department of Transportation and the National PNT Executive CommitteeCivil lead for GPS, the Volpe Center's vulnerability assessment and complementary PNT demonstrations, and Executive Order 13905 on responsible use of PNT services.
European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) and the Galileo Service CentreOperate Galileo services including Open Service Navigation Message Authentication and publish user-segment and market reports.
Resilient Navigation and Timing FoundationNon-profit that tracks interference incidents and policy on PNT resilience and backups.
DatasetSteward
GPS performance and interference reportingUnited States National Coordination Office for Space-Based PNT
GNSS interference map from aircraft navigation-integrity dataGPSJam (John Wiseman)
International GNSS Service products and station dataInternational GNSS Service
Galileo service status and noticesEuropean GNSS Service Centre

04પદ્ધતિ

From a lost satellite signal to a timing budget: how long a site can hold over

When the satellite signal is jammed or spoofed, a site's clock drifts from the frequency offset it had at the moment of loss plus its ageing; the accumulated time error against the budget a network tolerates fixes the hours the site can run on holdover, and the resilience decision is about the clock class and the complementary source.

Sources: Psiaki and Humphreys, GNSS Spoofing and Detection (2016); Ioannides, Pany and Gibbons, Known Vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Status, and Potential Mitigation Techniques (2016); Sadlier, Flytkjaer, Sabri and Herr, The economic impact on the UK of a disruption to GNSS (London Economics) (2017); Executive Order 13905, Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services (2020).

05At a glance

At a glance, hub and courses

3D ગ્રાફ

ટેકનોલોજી અને ડિજિટલ પ્રણાલીઓ ફેકલ્ટી

295 nodes1,814 relations9 views

Explore the 3D graph: Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems

06કન્સોલ

How Positioning, navigation and timing resilience is taught, as a process you can run

Press Play to run this process from this page's own data.

સ્થાન નિર્ધારણ, નેવિગેશન અને સમય સ્થિતિસ્થાપકતા

How Positioning, navigation and timing resilience is taught

5 subjects in scope, 3 key terms, courses in development, 1 lab, in the Cyber, Digital and Space Systems department of Technology and Digital Systems: from the scope to the method and its terms, the courses that teach it, the labs on the twin, the assessment and the record.

  1. 01 Scope

    1. 01

      GNSS systems and signals

      Start · the discipline

      GNSS systems and signals

    2. 02

      Timing for…

      Start · the discipline

      Timing for telecommunications, power and finance

    3. 03

      Jamming and spoofing

      Start · the discipline

      Jamming and spoofing

    4. 04

      Space weather effects…

      Start · the discipline

      Space weather effects on GNSS

    5. 05

      Interference detection…

      Start · the discipline

      Interference detection and monitoring

  2. 02 Method and terms

    1. 06

      From a lost satellite…

      Model · the learner

      When the satellite signal is jammed or spoofed, a site's clock drifts from the frequency offset it had at the moment of loss plus its…

    2. 07

      GNSS

      Record · the discipline

      Global navigation satellite systems, such as GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and BeiDou.

    3. 09

      Spoofing

      Record · the discipline

      Broadcasting false GNSS signals so that a receiver computes a wrong position or time.

    4. 11

      Jamming

      Record · the discipline

      Transmitting radio noise that prevents a receiver from tracking GNSS signals.

  3. 04 Labs

    1. 08

      ટ્વિન

      Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin

      The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.

  4. 05 Assess

    1. 10

      Module checks

      Gate · the course

      Each module ends with a short check against its outcomes.

    2. 12

      Assessed work

      Decision · the learner

      The assessed work that closes a course: a lab record, a case memo or an assignment, reviewed against the rubric.

  5. 06 Record

    1. 13

      પૂર્ણતા રેકોર્ડ

      Outcome · the learner

      The record stacks into the discipline achievement.

    2. 14

      Discipline achievement

      Record · the Academy

      The discipline achievement follows the discipline rule, read from the records.

Positioning, navigation and timing resilience · Cyber, Digital and Space Systems An outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.

07શિક્ષણ

Achievements, where this is practised, practised in and across the ecosystem

Achievements

Achievements in this discipline

  1. Course achievements

    One for each course with this as its primary discipline, earned when you pass the course's assessed activities.

An achievement is a record of the learning completed and assessed here. How recognition works.

Where this is practised

Where the subject is practised

A field platform page on this subject is in development.

Practised in

The two Foundry systems where it is practised

Foundry system pages describe what each system and its rooms are designed to do; the courses teach the methods these systems apply.

Across the ecosystem

Across the ecosystem

The science, platforms and standards this discipline draws on and contributes to across the ecosystem.

Foundations in the STEM Commons

  • The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Space systems and satellite servicesSpace systems and satellite services provide positioning, timing, communication and observation from orbit.
  • Communications and network technologyCommunications and network technology cover the systems that carry voice, data and control signals, including fixed, mobile, satellite and undersea links.
  • Reliability and resilience engineeringReliability and resilience engineering studies how systems fail, how failures can be prevented and how systems absorb, adapt and recover from disruption.

Pages of the ecosystem, cited so learners can follow the field into research, platforms, standards and national practice.

08ભાગ લો

Take part in Technology and Digital Systems

તમે કોણ છો ત્યાંથી શરૂ કરો.

Routes

  • માર્ગ

    રાષ્ટ્રીય સંસ્થાઓ

    Ministries, statistics offices and agencies: a national desk and chapter, and a seat in the working groups. National chapters

  • માર્ગ

    Sectors and professions

    Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches technology and digital systems. For organisations

  • માર્ગ

    શિક્ષણ

    Courses and practice, with a record of every course completed. Free to study. Open learning

  • માર્ગ

    ધોરણો

    Draft, review and adopt the methods and data standards with the working groups. Working groups

  • માર્ગ

    Communities and research

    Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the Academy

Open calls

Open callSeeksCloses
Founding call for experts to the working groups CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTSexpert, editor, chair2026-12-15
Open nomination for the three independent expert seats of the Global Standards Council CALL-GSC-INDપરિષદ-સભ્ય2026-12-01
Nominations of interim regional members (applies only if the transitional provision is decided) CALL-GSC-REGપરિષદ-સભ્ય2026-12-15
Review of the wave-1 risk core outlines (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1contributor2027-01-31
જોખમ વિજ્ઞાનનાં મુખ્ય ધોરણો માટે નિષ્ણાતો: અનિશ્ચિતતા અને પુરાવા ગ્રેડિંગ, માપક્રમો, સંરચિત નિષ્ણાત નિર્ણય, સહનશીલતા, ચરમસીમાઓ અને સંયુક્ત ઘટનાઓ, આપત્તિજનક અને અસ્તિત્વગત જોખમ, નીતિશાસ્ત્ર અને સમાનતા, એકમો અને માપન (NRS-C17 થી NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCEexpert, editor, chair2027-01-31
Independent reviewers for the families of the hazard atlas, three from at least two regions for each family (NHS2-R19), priority families first CALL-ATLAS-REVIEWનિષ્ણાત2027-03-31
વચગાળાની અગ્રણી સલામતી સમીક્ષા પેનલના સભ્યો અને રેડ-ટીમ સમીક્ષકો (જૈવ સલામતી અને જૈવ સુરક્ષા, AI સલામતી અને સુરક્ષા, મહત્વપૂર્ણ માળખાગત સુરક્ષા); અરજીઓ ગુપ્ત રીતે સંભાળાય છે CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEWનિષ્ણાત2026-11-30
આવશ્યકતા રજિસ્ટર, NHS-2 મશીન પ્રતિનિધિત્વ, અનુરૂપતા પરીક્ષણ સમૂહો અને અનુરૂપતા મૂલ્યાંકન યોજના માટે ઓન્ટોલોજી, માપવિજ્ઞાન, સોફ્ટવેર ચકાસણી અને અનુરૂપતા મૂલ્યાંકનના નિષ્ણાતો CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGYexpert, editor2027-01-31

Calls past their closing date are hidden automatically. Every call, proposal and route: open areas and calls.

Cells and CERTs

  1. Gather the cell

    Bring together three to seven people with complementary skills: data, field practice, policy and communication.

  2. Register it

    Write to the team with the cell's name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the Academy

  3. Choose a charter

    Pick one focus: research and evidence, data and maps, standards review, or community preparedness.

  4. Learn together

    Follow shared study paths at Risk Academy, with practice and a record of every course completed. Hazards and resilience

  5. Lead and report

    Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups

  • Specialise as a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)

    A CERT prepares its neighbourhood for the hazards it faces. It builds a local hazard profile from this site's map. It trains in household and street preparedness. It learns first aid and light search through recognised local providers, and it runs drills. A CERT works alongside the local emergency services and follows their direction. It never replaces them and is not an emergency service.

સૂચકાંક

What a national team or a local community can do on The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) today.

  • NXS-GRX

    Your country's profile

    Open risk profiles for 195 countries, with sources and licences on every value. Open the Index

  • NXS-GRX

    Correct or reply

    Correct a value or reply for your country. The change is logged with its effect. Open the Index

  • NXS-GRX

    Offer data

    Offer a dataset. It enters through the licence gate, with your credit. Open the Index

  • NXS-GRX

    Use the open data

    Layers, profiles and tiles through the open API. Open the Index

09References

Core references and where to begin

Start with Ioannides, then Psiaki, then Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.

  1. Psiaki, M. L. and Humphreys, T. E., GNSS Spoofing and Detection (2016). DOI
  2. Ioannides, R. T., Pany, T. and Gibbons, G., Known Vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Status, and Potential Mitigation Techniques (2016). DOI
  3. Kerns, A. J., Shepard, D. P., Bhatti, J. A. and Humphreys, T. E., Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control via GPS Spoofing (2014). DOI
  4. Hegarty, C. J. and Chatre, E., Evolution of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (2008). DOI
  5. Kintner, P. M., Ledvina, B. M. and de Paula, E. R., GPS and ionospheric scintillations (2007). DOI
  6. Sadlier, G., Flytkjær, R., Sabri, F. and Herr, D., The economic impact on the UK of a disruption to GNSS (London Economics) (2017). gov.uk
  7. O'Connor, A. C., Gallaher, M. P., Clark-Sutton, K. et al., Economic Benefits of the Global Positioning System (GPS) (RTI International) (2019). rti.org
  8. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System (2001). rosap.ntl.bts.gov
  9. Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 13905: Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services (2020). federalregister.gov

10પ્રશ્નો

પ્રશ્નો, જવાબો અને મુખ્ય શબ્દો

શું અહીં અભ્યાસ મફત છે?

હા. Nexus Consortium ની આગેવાની હેઠળની Risk Academy નો દરેક અભ્યાસક્રમ અને શિક્ષણ સામગ્રી અભ્યાસ માટે મફત છે, સ્વ-ગતિએ અથવા સમૂહ સાથે. સામાન્ય ભાગીદારી માટે કોઈ ફી નથી; ચૂકવણીવાળું કાર્ય, ઇન્ટર્નશિપ અને ફેલોશિપ અલગ વ્યવસ્થાઓ છે.

અભ્યાસક્રમ પૂર્ણ કરવાથી મને શું મળે છે?

A completion record: the course, its version, the date and what was assessed, private by default and shared by you. It stacks into discipline, department and programme achievements. A record states what was studied and assessed and does not certify competence; it is not a licence, a professional title or an employment status.

ડેટા અને સ્થળો ક્યાંથી આવે છે?

Every faculty teaches on a twin of a real place built from open data; each layer carries its provider, licence and date, and every result on the Academy states its source. Maps and figures are indicators for teaching, never an assessment of a place.

How do I take part beyond the courses in positioning, navigation and timing resilience?

Form a competence cell of three to seven people, study a shared pathway, take a supervised assignment in the National Working Groups, or bring a cohort from your institution. For organisations.

મુખ્ય શબ્દો

GNSS
Global navigation satellite systems, such as GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and BeiDou.
Spoofing
Broadcasting false GNSS signals so that a receiver computes a wrong position or time.
Jamming
Transmitting radio noise that prevents a receiver from tracking GNSS signals.
Holdover
The time a clock can keep accurate time after losing its reference signal.

અહેવાલોયોગદાન આપો

આ પૃષ્ઠ પરથી પુરાવાનું યોગદાન આપો.

Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

Risk Academy

Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.

સ્થાન નિર્ધારણ, નેવિગેશન અને સમય સ્થિતિસ્થાપકતા

Prepare with a related course

Open courses in connected disciplines teach the methods this discipline will build on.

અભ્યાસક્રમ સૂચિ જુઓBack to Department of Cyber, Digital and Space Systems