Risk Academy, led by the Nexus Consortium · Technology and Digital Systems · Department of Cyber, Digital and Space Systems
Securing the systems that move valves, breakers and machines
Teknolojia ya uendeshaji na usalama wa kimtandao-kimwili
When control systems are attacked the consequences are physical: a breaker opens, a pump stops, a process runs out of its safe envelope.
Map operational technology and cyber-physical security on a real placeSee the courses
Illustrative: packages on a board with routed traces carrying clocked signals, or a data hall of racks and their status lights
01Wigo
What the discipline covers
The subtopics its courses and labs teach.
- Kozi
- In preparation
- Ngazi
- In development
- Maabara
- In development
- Industrial control systems and SCADA
- The IEC 62443 series
- Safety and security co-engineering
- Attacks with physical consequences
- Network segmentation and the Purdue model
- Vulnerability management in OT
- Industrial internet of things
- Incident response in industrial environments
- Medical device and vehicle cyber security
02Ramani
Build a twin of any place
Search any place or open the world; the layers and generators follow operational technology and cyber-physical security on the planet map, the globe and in 3D.
- Terrain 0 to 245 m
- 4 satellite dishes
- 74 communication masts and towers
- 12 telephone exchanges
- 7 data centres and cable landing stations
- 12 aerodromes
- 1 telecom offices
- Communication line 161 km
- 729 known exploited vulnerabilities since 2023-10-17
- Night-time lights, VIIRS day-night band: read live when the 3D twin opens
Drag to move, right drag or Shift with a drag to turn and tilt, Ctrl with the wheel to zoom. Keyboard: arrows move, Shift with arrows turn and tilt, + and – zoom, 0 resets, V steps through the views, Escape clears.
Flat plan of the same data: relief as contours from the inline grid, the mapped ground infrastructure by kind, the mapped cables and the numbers below. The 3D twin opens on devices that can draw it, once its data and code have been checked.
The boundaries, names and designations shown do not imply any judgement on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Countries: Natural Earth (public domain).
03The subject
The subject, methods and measures and debates and bodies
The discipline
The field and its scope
For control engineers, plant security leads, safety officers and regulators who must protect systems whose failure moves valves, trips breakers, doses patients or steers vehicles.
Operational technology and cyber-physical security covers the security of systems that monitor and control physical processes: industrial control systems and SCADA in energy, water and manufacturing, building automation, medical devices, vehicles and the industrial internet of things. Its distinguishing feature is consequence: an attack or failure produces a physical effect, from a lost batch to an explosion, a blackout or a patient harmed, and the controls of information security must be combined with the safety engineering that already governs these plants. The field's reference points are the IEC 62443 series for zones, conduits and security levels, NIST SP 800-82 for industrial control security, IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 for functional safety, and sector rules for medical devices and vehicles.
It is practised by asset owners, vendors, system integrators, safety and security consultants and national agencies, with a thin but instructive incident record: Stuxnet (2010), the Ukrainian grid attacks (2015 and 2016), the Triton safety-system intrusion (2017) and recurring ransomware that stops production by hitting the IT systems plants depend on. The characteristic difficulties are long equipment lifetimes, patch windows measured in years, protocols without authentication, and the organisational divide between operations and security teams.
Measures
Quantities and units
| Quantity | Unit or scale | What to know |
|---|---|---|
| Security level target and achieved (IEC 62443-3-3) | SL 0 to 4 per zone, for each of seven foundational requirements | An ordinal design target tied to an assumed attacker capability; the achieved level is assessed against requirement lists, not against observed attacker success, and a level for a zone says nothing about the conduits into it. |
| Probability of failure on demand of a safety instrumented function | dimensionless average, mapped to SIL 1 to 4 (IEC 61511) | Calculated from component failure rates and proof-test intervals; the calculation assumes independent random failures and does not model a cyber attack on the safety controller, which was exactly the Triton scenario. |
| Time to patch and share of unpatched known vulnerabilities | days; percent of assets | Patching in operational technology waits for vendor validation and plant outages, so medians of months to years are common; compensating controls, not patch rates, are the meaningful measure. |
| Asset inventory completeness | percent of networked devices identified and classified | Measured by passive network monitoring against engineering records; first-pass inventories commonly find a material share of devices the asset owner did not know were connected. |
| Network segmentation exposure | count of permitted flows across the IT/OT boundary and between zones; count of devices reachable from the internet | Internet-reachable control devices are counted by search engines for connected devices; the count depends on scanning coverage and on devices that respond on industrial ports being correctly classified. |
| Mean time to detect and to restore after an OT incident | hours or days | Sparse and self-reported; restoration in operational technology includes physical inspection before restart, so recovery times exceed IT norms even when the cyber component is resolved. |
Mbinu
Methods and their limits
Each method is listed with what it assumes and where it fails.
| Mbinu | Assumes | Fails when |
|---|---|---|
| Zones and conduits with security levels (IEC 62443-3-2 and 3–3) | The plant can be partitioned into zones of common security requirement, with every path between zones identified as a conduit that can be controlled. | When undocumented connections (vendor remote access, engineering laptops, cellular modems) bypass the conduits, and when the partition reflects the network drawing rather than the installed plant. |
| Purdue reference model segmentation | A hierarchy from field devices to enterprise systems, with a demilitarised zone between operations and corporate networks, limits the reach of an intrusion. | With cloud-connected industrial internet of things devices that send data from level 1 to the internet, with flat legacy networks that cannot be re-cabled, and when the model is applied as a diagram rather than enforced with monitored boundaries. |
| Safety and security co-engineering (STPA-Sec, combined HAZOP and security analysis) | Hazard analysis from the safety lifecycle can be extended with intentional causes, and the two disciplines can agree on one control structure. | When the safety case is frozen at commissioning and security is added later, when safety and security changes conflict (a security patch that voids safety validation), and when the organisations owning each do not share information. |
| Passive network monitoring and anomaly detection | Industrial traffic is regular enough that deviations in protocol use, commands or timing indicate compromise or malfunction. | During maintenance and process changes that look like anomalies, against attackers who use legitimate engineering tools and commands, and when the monitoring sees only the networks it was placed on. |
| Vulnerability management with compensating controls | Where patching is impossible, exposure can be reduced by isolation, allow-listing, protocol filtering and monitoring, and the residual risk can be recorded. | When compensating controls are declared but not verified, when a vendor's end-of-support leaves no path, and when an unpatchable device is also safety-critical. |
| Incident response and recovery exercises specific to industrial environments | Manual operation, safe shutdown and restart can be rehearsed, and that operations and security teams can act under one plan. | When manual operation skills have been lost to automation, when the exercise avoids touching the live process, and when the plan depends on IT systems that the same incident has taken down. |
Debates
What the field debates
- Should operational technology be air-gapped from corporate networks and the internet, or connected and defended?
- Isolation advocates point to the incident record, where most intrusions entered through IT, and to the ineffectiveness of patching in OT. Connection advocates point to the operational and safety gains of remote monitoring and predictive maintenance, to evidence that air gaps are routinely bridged in practice by removable media and vendor access (Stuxnet crossed one), and to the loss of visibility when networks are unmonitored. The practical middle is strict, monitored conduits, with disagreement over how many.
- Who should bear the cost of securing legacy control systems: asset owners, vendors or the state?
- Regulators in the European Union have placed product obligations on vendors through the Cyber Resilience Act and operator obligations through NIS2, arguing that insecure-by-design products should not be sold. Vendors and some owners argue that 20-year equipment cannot be retrofitted at reasonable cost and that mandated replacement would cause its own outages. The evidence consists of cost estimates and the incident record rather than controlled comparison.
- Does disclosure of industrial control vulnerabilities help defenders more than attackers?
- Those favouring full public advisories argue that owners cannot prioritise what they do not know and that attackers already have the information; CISA's ICS advisories follow this approach. Those favouring restricted disclosure argue that exploitation of a disclosed OT vulnerability can take years to patch and that the physical consequences differ from IT. The evidence on exploitation timing in OT is thin.
Bodies and data
Bodies that set practice, and the data they publish
Bodies and standards are named so learners can find and apply their published work; the Academy teaches their use and links to the publisher, and no affiliation is implied.
| Body | Role in the field |
|---|---|
| International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) TC 65 | Maintains the IEC 62443 series on industrial automation and control system security, with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 for functional safety. |
| ISA (International Society of Automation) | Co-develops the ISA/IEC 62443 standards and runs the related conformity assessment scheme for products and processes. |
| National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) | Publishes SP 800-82 Revision 3, the guide to operational technology security, and the Cybersecurity Framework profiles for manufacturing. |
| Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) | Issues industrial control system advisories, the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, and coordinates vulnerability disclosure for control system vendors. |
| European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and national NIS2 authorities | Guidance for operators of essential services, sector-specific risk measures and incident reporting under the NIS2 Directive and the network code on cybersecurity for electricity. |
| Food and Drug Administration (United States) and the International Medical Device Regulators Forum | Set premarket and postmarket cybersecurity expectations for medical devices, including software bills of materials in submissions. |
| Dataset | Steward |
|---|---|
| ICS advisories | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
| MITRE ATT&CK for ICS | MITRE Corporation |
| Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
| National Vulnerability Database (NVD) | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
04Mbinu
From a failure rate to a safety integrity level, and the attack the arithmetic cannot see
A safety instrumented function's probability of failure on demand follows from its dangerous failure rate and its proof-test interval, and maps to a safety integrity level; the calculation assumes random, independent faults, so the security level of the zone around the controller is a separate decision that the safety figure never covers.
Sources: Stouffer et al., Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3) (2023); Kriaa, Pietre-Cambacedes, Bouissou and Halgand, A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems (2015); Young and Leveson, An integrated approach to safety and security based on systems theory (2014).
05At a glance
At a glance, hub and courses
- Build a twin of any placeTwin builderWorked example: West Cornwall: Goonhilly and the Porthcurno cable landings · 4 generators · 7 layers · 3 instruments
Grafu ya 3D
Kitivo cha Teknolojia na Mifumo ya Kidijitali
295 nodes1,814 relations9 views
06Dashibodi
How Operational technology and cyber-physical security is taught, as a process you can run
Press Play to run this process from this page's own data.
Teknolojia ya uendeshaji na usalama wa kimtandao-kimwili
How Operational technology and cyber-physical security is taught
5 subjects in scope, 3 key terms, courses in development, 1 lab, in the Cyber, Digital and Space Systems department of Technology and Digital Systems: from the scope to the method and its terms, the courses that teach it, the labs on the twin, the assessment and the record.
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01 Scope
- 01
Industrial control…
Start · the discipline
Industrial control systems and SCADA
- 02
The IEC 62443 series
Start · the discipline
The IEC 62443 series
- 03
Safety and security…
Start · the discipline
Safety and security co-engineering
- 04
Attacks with physical…
Start · the discipline
Attacks with physical consequences
- 05
Network segmentation…
Start · the discipline
Network segmentation and the Purdue model
- 01
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02 Method and terms
- 06
From a failure rate to…
Model · the learner
A safety instrumented function's probability of failure on demand follows from its dangerous failure rate and its proof-test interval, and…
- 07
Operational technology
Record · the discipline
Hardware and software that monitor and control physical devices and processes.
- 09
SCADA
Record · the discipline
Supervisory control and data acquisition: systems that monitor and control distributed industrial assets.
- 11
Security level
Record · the discipline
In IEC 62443, a measure of the resistance of a zone or component to attackers of increasing capability.
- 06
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04 Labs
- 08
Pacha
Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin
The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.
- 08
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05 Assess
- 10
Module checks
Gate · the course
Each module ends with a short check against its outcomes.
- 12
Assessed work
Decision · the learner
The assessed work that closes a course: a lab record, a case memo or an assignment, reviewed against the rubric.
- 10
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06 Record
- 13
Rekodi ya ukamilishaji
Outcome · the learner
The record stacks into the discipline achievement.
- 14
Discipline achievement
Record · the Academy
The discipline achievement follows the discipline rule, read from the records.
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Operational technology and cyber-physical security · Cyber, Digital and Space Systems An outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.
07Kujifunza
Achievements, where this is practised, practised in and across the ecosystem
Mafanikio
Achievements in this discipline
Course achievements
One for each course with this as its primary discipline, earned when you pass the course's assessed activities.
An achievement is a record of the learning completed and assessed here. How recognition works.
Where this is practised
Where the subject is practised
A field platform page on this subject is in development.
Practised in
The three Foundry systems where it is practised
- FoundryNXS-NSF systemAuthorisation and assurance of control systems
- NXS-NET systemIndustrial networks must stay up under attack
- NXS-OPS systemControl systems run physical instruments and installations
Foundry system pages describe what each system and its rooms are designed to do; the courses teach the methods these systems apply.
Across the ecosystem
Across the ecosystem
The science, platforms and standards this discipline draws on and contributes to across the ecosystem.
Foundations in the STEM Commons
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Cybersecurity and cryptographyCybersecurity and cryptography protect information systems and data from unauthorised access, disruption and manipulation.
- Sensors, IoT and observation networksSensors, IoT and observation networks collect continuous measurements of physical, environmental and operational conditions.
- Process and industrial safety engineeringProcess and industrial safety engineering prevents and mitigates fires, explosions and toxic releases in industrial facilities.
- Software and safety-critical systems engineeringSoftware and safety-critical systems engineering develops software whose failure could cause harm, loss of life or major disruption.
Pages of the ecosystem, cited so learners can follow the field into research, platforms, standards and national practice.
08Shiriki
Take part in Technology and Digital Systems
Anza na wewe ni nani.
Njia
Njia
Taasisi za kitaifa
Wizara, ofisi za takwimu na mashirika: dawati na tawi la kitaifa, na kiti katika vikundi kazi. Sura za kitaifa
Njia
Sekta na taaluma
Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches technology and digital systems. For organisations
Njia
Kujifunza
Kozi na mazoezi, pamoja na rekodi ya kila kozi iliyokamilishwa. Kusoma ni bure. Ujifunzaji huria
Njia
Viwango
Andaa rasimu, kagua na pitisha mbinu na viwango vya data pamoja na vikundi kazi. Vikundi kazi
Njia
Jumuiya na utafiti
Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the Academy
Miito wazi
| Mwito wazi | Inatafuta | Inafungwa |
|---|---|---|
| Mwito wa uanzishaji kwa wataalamu wa vikundi kazi CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTS | mtaalamu, mhariri, mwenyekiti | 2026-12-15 |
| Uteuzi wazi kwa viti vitatu vya wataalamu huru vya Baraza la Viwango la Dunia CALL-GSC-IND | mjumbe wa baraza | 2026-12-01 |
| Uteuzi wa wanachama wa kikanda wa muda (unatumika tu ikiwa kifungu cha mpito kitaamuliwa) CALL-GSC-REG | mjumbe wa baraza | 2026-12-15 |
| Ukaguzi wa miongozo ya kiini cha hatari ya wimbi la 1 (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1 | mchangiaji | 2027-01-31 |
| Wataalamu wa viwango vya msingi vya sayansi ya hatari: kutokuwa na uhakika na upangaji wa ushahidi, vipimo, maamuzi ya wataalamu yaliyopangwa, ustahimilivu, matukio makali na ya mchanganyiko, hatari za maafa makubwa na za kuwepo, maadili na usawa, vipimo na upimaji (NRS-C17 hadi NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCE | mtaalamu, mhariri, mwenyekiti | 2027-01-31 |
| Wakaguzi huru wa familia za atlasi ya hatari, watatu kutoka angalau kanda mbili kwa kila familia (NHS2-R19), familia za kipaumbele kwanza CALL-ATLAS-REVIEW | mtaalamu | 2027-03-31 |
| Wajumbe wa Jopo la muda la Ukaguzi wa Usalama wa Mipaka Mipya na wakaguzi wa timu nyekundu (usalama wa kibiolojia na ulinzi wa kibiolojia, usalama na ulinzi wa AI, ulinzi wa miundombinu muhimu); maombi hushughulikiwa kwa usiri CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEW | mtaalamu | 2026-11-30 |
| Wataalamu wa ontolojia, metrolojia, uthibitishaji wa programu na tathmini ya ulinganifu kwa rejista ya mahitaji, uwakilishi wa mashine wa NHS-2, seti za majaribio ya ulinganifu na mpango wa tathmini ya ulinganifu CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGY | mtaalamu, mhariri | 2027-01-31 |
Miito iliyopita tarehe ya kufungwa hufichwa kiotomatiki. Kila mwito, pendekezo na njia: maeneo na miito wazi.
Seli na CERT
Kusanya seli
Leta pamoja watu watatu hadi saba wenye ujuzi unaokamilishana: data, mazoezi ya uwandani, sera na mawasiliano.
Isajili
Write to the team with the cell's name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the Academy
Chagua hati
Chagua lengo moja: utafiti na ushahidi, data na ramani, ukaguzi wa viwango, au utayari wa jamii.
Jifunzeni pamoja
Fuata njia za pamoja za masomo katika Risk Academy, pamoja na mazoezi na rekodi ya kila kozi iliyokamilishwa. Hatari na ustahimilivu
Ongoza na uripoti
Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups
Bobea kama Timu ya Jamii ya Kukabili Dharura (CERT)
A CERT prepares its neighbourhood for the hazards it faces. It builds a local hazard profile from this site's map. It trains in household and street preparedness. It learns first aid and light search through recognised local providers, and it runs drills. A CERT works alongside the local emergency services and follows their direction. It never replaces them and is not an emergency service.
Kielezo
What a national team or a local community can do on The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) today.
NXS-GRX
Your country's profile
Wasifu wazi wa hatari kwa nchi 195, pamoja na vyanzo na leseni kwa kila thamani. Fungua Faharasa
NXS-GRX
Sahihisha au jibu
Sahihisha thamani au jibu kwa niaba ya nchi yako. Mabadiliko yanarekodiwa pamoja na athari yake. Fungua Faharasa
NXS-GRX
Toa data
Toa seti ya data. Inaingia kupitia lango la leseni, ikiwa na utajo wako. Fungua Faharasa
NXS-GRX
Tumia data wazi
Tabaka, wasifu na vigae kupitia API wazi. Fungua Faharasa
09References
Core references and where to begin
Start with Stouffer, then Langner, then Humayed.
- Stouffer, K., Pease, M., Tang, C. et al., Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3) (2023). csrc.nist.gov
- Langner, R., Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon (2011). DOI
- Cárdenas, A. A., Amin, S., Lin, Z.-S. et al., Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response (2011). DOI
- Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F. and Luo, B., Cyber-Physical Systems Security: A Survey (2017). DOI
- Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M. and Halgand, Y., A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems (2015). DOI
- Young, W. and Leveson, N. G., An integrated approach to safety and security based on systems theory (2014). DOI
- Williams, T. J., The Purdue enterprise reference architecture (1994). DOI
- Slay, J. and Miller, M., Lessons Learned from the Maroochy Water Breach (2008). DOI
- Leveson, N. G., Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied to Safety (2011). DOI
10Maswali
Maswali, majibu na istilahi muhimu
Je, kusoma hapa ni bure?
Ndiyo. Kila kozi na nyenzo ya kujifunzia ya Risk Academy, inayoongozwa na Nexus Consortium, ni bure kusoma, kwa kasi yako mwenyewe au pamoja na kundi. Ushiriki wa kawaida hauna ada. Kazi inayolipwa, mafunzo kazini na ushirika wa kitaaluma ni mipango tofauti.
Kukamilisha kozi kunanipa nini?
Rekodi ya ukamilishaji: kozi, toleo lake, tarehe na kilichotathminiwa. Ni ya faragha kwa chaguo-msingi na huishiriki wewe mwenyewe. Hujumlishwa kuwa mafanikio ya taaluma, idara na programu. Rekodi inaeleza kilichosomwa na kutathminiwa na haithibitishi umahiri; si leseni, cheo cha kitaaluma wala hali ya ajira.
Data na maeneo yanatoka wapi?
Kila kitivo hufundisha kwa kutumia pacha wa mahali halisi uliojengwa kwa data huria. Kila tabaka lina mtoa data, leseni na tarehe yake, na kila matokeo ya Academy yanataja chanzo chake. Ramani na takwimu ni viashiria vya kufundishia, si tathmini ya mahali popote.
How do I take part beyond the courses in operational technology and cyber-physical security?
Unda seli ya umahiri ya watu watatu hadi saba, soma njia ya pamoja, chukua kazi inayosimamiwa katika Vikundi Kazi vya Kitaifa, au leta kundi la wanafunzi kutoka taasisi yako. Kwa mashirika.
Istilahi kuu
- Operational technology
- Hardware and software that monitor and control physical devices and processes.
- SCADA
- Supervisory control and data acquisition: systems that monitor and control distributed industrial assets.
- Security level
- In IEC 62443, a measure of the resistance of a zone or component to attackers of increasing capability.
- Zones and conduits
- The IEC 62443 approach of grouping assets with common security needs and controlling communication between them.
RipotiChangia
Changia ushahidi kutoka ukurasa huu.
Reports ni chapisho la robo mwaka la Muungano. Unachojua kuhusu mada hii kinaweza kuwa ushahidi, mfano au marekebisho katika toleo lijalo, kikitajwa kwa jina lako na kuchapishwa chini ya CC BY 4.0 pale kinapokuwa kazi yako mwenyewe.
Risk Academy
- EmailGateway GW-ACADEMY Send it from this page Evidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen deposit Deposit it and submit to the community Publish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsRisk Academy See every way to contribute The contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Usitume kamwe data binafsi, maelezo nyeti ya miundombinu wala chochote ambacho huna haki ya kukishiriki. Mchango hupitiwa kabla ya kutumika; kuutuma hakutoi haki za uandishi wala za uhariri, na udhamini haununui matokeo.
Teknolojia ya uendeshaji na usalama wa kimtandao-kimwili
Prepare with a related course
Open courses in connected disciplines teach the methods this discipline will build on.
Vinjari orodha ya koziBack to Department of Cyber, Digital and Space Systems