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Risk Academy, led by the Nexus Consortium · Technology and Digital Systems · Department of Cyber, Digital and Space Systems

Securing the systems that move valves, breakers and machines

Teknolojia ya uendeshaji na usalama wa kimtandao-kimwili

When control systems are attacked the consequences are physical: a breaker opens, a pump stops, a process runs out of its safe envelope.

Map operational technology and cyber-physical security on a real placeSee the courses

Illustrative: packages on a board with routed traces carrying clocked signals, or a data hall of racks and their status lights

01Wigo

What the discipline covers

The subtopics its courses and labs teach.

Kozi
In preparation
Ngazi
In development
Maabara
In development
  • Industrial control systems and SCADA
  • The IEC 62443 series
  • Safety and security co-engineering
  • Attacks with physical consequences
  • Network segmentation and the Purdue model
  • Vulnerability management in OT
  • Industrial internet of things
  • Incident response in industrial environments
  • Medical device and vehicle cyber security

02Ramani

Build a twin of any place

Search any place or open the world; the layers and generators follow operational technology and cyber-physical security on the planet map, the globe and in 3D.

West Cornwall: Goonhilly and the Porthcurno cable landings: a flat plan of the faculty twin. Terrain 0 to 245 m; 4 satellite dishes; 74 communication masts and towers; 12 telephone exchanges; 7 data centres and cable landing stations; 12 aerodromes; 1 telecom offices; Communication line 161 km; 729 known exploited vulnerabilities since 2023-10-17; Night-time lights, VIIRS day-night band: read live when the 3D twin opens. Contours every 25 metres from the elevation grid; communication cables by class; ground infrastructure as marks.
West Cornwall: Goonhilly and the Porthcurno cable landings, United Kingdom. Flat plan of the same data: relief as contours from the inline grid, the mapped ground infrastructure by kind, the mapped cables and the numbers below. The 3D twin opens on devices that can draw it, once its data and code have been checked.
  • Terrain 0 to 245 m
  • 4 satellite dishes
  • 74 communication masts and towers
  • 12 telephone exchanges
  • 7 data centres and cable landing stations
  • 12 aerodromes
  • 1 telecom offices
  • Communication line 161 km
  • 729 known exploited vulnerabilities since 2023-10-17
  • Night-time lights, VIIRS day-night band: read live when the 3D twin opens
Credits and dates per layer are listed under the stage. Relief in the twin is exaggerated ×1.5 for legibility.

Drag to move, right drag or Shift with a drag to turn and tilt, Ctrl with the wheel to zoom. Keyboard: arrows move, Shift with arrows turn and tilt, + and – zoom, 0 resets, V steps through the views, Escape clears.

Flat plan of the same data: relief as contours from the inline grid, the mapped ground infrastructure by kind, the mapped cables and the numbers below. The 3D twin opens on devices that can draw it, once its data and code have been checked.

The boundaries, names and designations shown do not imply any judgement on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Countries: Natural Earth (public domain).

03The subject

The subject, methods and measures and debates and bodies

The discipline

The field and its scope

For control engineers, plant security leads, safety officers and regulators who must protect systems whose failure moves valves, trips breakers, doses patients or steers vehicles.

Operational technology and cyber-physical security covers the security of systems that monitor and control physical processes: industrial control systems and SCADA in energy, water and manufacturing, building automation, medical devices, vehicles and the industrial internet of things. Its distinguishing feature is consequence: an attack or failure produces a physical effect, from a lost batch to an explosion, a blackout or a patient harmed, and the controls of information security must be combined with the safety engineering that already governs these plants. The field's reference points are the IEC 62443 series for zones, conduits and security levels, NIST SP 800-82 for industrial control security, IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 for functional safety, and sector rules for medical devices and vehicles.

It is practised by asset owners, vendors, system integrators, safety and security consultants and national agencies, with a thin but instructive incident record: Stuxnet (2010), the Ukrainian grid attacks (2015 and 2016), the Triton safety-system intrusion (2017) and recurring ransomware that stops production by hitting the IT systems plants depend on. The characteristic difficulties are long equipment lifetimes, patch windows measured in years, protocols without authentication, and the organisational divide between operations and security teams.

Measures

Quantities and units

QuantityUnit or scaleWhat to know
Security level target and achieved (IEC 62443-3-3)SL 0 to 4 per zone, for each of seven foundational requirementsAn ordinal design target tied to an assumed attacker capability; the achieved level is assessed against requirement lists, not against observed attacker success, and a level for a zone says nothing about the conduits into it.
Probability of failure on demand of a safety instrumented functiondimensionless average, mapped to SIL 1 to 4 (IEC 61511)Calculated from component failure rates and proof-test intervals; the calculation assumes independent random failures and does not model a cyber attack on the safety controller, which was exactly the Triton scenario.
Time to patch and share of unpatched known vulnerabilitiesdays; percent of assetsPatching in operational technology waits for vendor validation and plant outages, so medians of months to years are common; compensating controls, not patch rates, are the meaningful measure.
Asset inventory completenesspercent of networked devices identified and classifiedMeasured by passive network monitoring against engineering records; first-pass inventories commonly find a material share of devices the asset owner did not know were connected.
Network segmentation exposurecount of permitted flows across the IT/OT boundary and between zones; count of devices reachable from the internetInternet-reachable control devices are counted by search engines for connected devices; the count depends on scanning coverage and on devices that respond on industrial ports being correctly classified.
Mean time to detect and to restore after an OT incidenthours or daysSparse and self-reported; restoration in operational technology includes physical inspection before restart, so recovery times exceed IT norms even when the cyber component is resolved.

Mbinu

Methods and their limits

Each method is listed with what it assumes and where it fails.

MbinuAssumesFails when
Zones and conduits with security levels (IEC 62443-3-2 and 3–3)The plant can be partitioned into zones of common security requirement, with every path between zones identified as a conduit that can be controlled.When undocumented connections (vendor remote access, engineering laptops, cellular modems) bypass the conduits, and when the partition reflects the network drawing rather than the installed plant.
Purdue reference model segmentationA hierarchy from field devices to enterprise systems, with a demilitarised zone between operations and corporate networks, limits the reach of an intrusion.With cloud-connected industrial internet of things devices that send data from level 1 to the internet, with flat legacy networks that cannot be re-cabled, and when the model is applied as a diagram rather than enforced with monitored boundaries.
Safety and security co-engineering (STPA-Sec, combined HAZOP and security analysis)Hazard analysis from the safety lifecycle can be extended with intentional causes, and the two disciplines can agree on one control structure.When the safety case is frozen at commissioning and security is added later, when safety and security changes conflict (a security patch that voids safety validation), and when the organisations owning each do not share information.
Passive network monitoring and anomaly detectionIndustrial traffic is regular enough that deviations in protocol use, commands or timing indicate compromise or malfunction.During maintenance and process changes that look like anomalies, against attackers who use legitimate engineering tools and commands, and when the monitoring sees only the networks it was placed on.
Vulnerability management with compensating controlsWhere patching is impossible, exposure can be reduced by isolation, allow-listing, protocol filtering and monitoring, and the residual risk can be recorded.When compensating controls are declared but not verified, when a vendor's end-of-support leaves no path, and when an unpatchable device is also safety-critical.
Incident response and recovery exercises specific to industrial environmentsManual operation, safe shutdown and restart can be rehearsed, and that operations and security teams can act under one plan.When manual operation skills have been lost to automation, when the exercise avoids touching the live process, and when the plan depends on IT systems that the same incident has taken down.

Debates

What the field debates

Should operational technology be air-gapped from corporate networks and the internet, or connected and defended?
Isolation advocates point to the incident record, where most intrusions entered through IT, and to the ineffectiveness of patching in OT. Connection advocates point to the operational and safety gains of remote monitoring and predictive maintenance, to evidence that air gaps are routinely bridged in practice by removable media and vendor access (Stuxnet crossed one), and to the loss of visibility when networks are unmonitored. The practical middle is strict, monitored conduits, with disagreement over how many.
Who should bear the cost of securing legacy control systems: asset owners, vendors or the state?
Regulators in the European Union have placed product obligations on vendors through the Cyber Resilience Act and operator obligations through NIS2, arguing that insecure-by-design products should not be sold. Vendors and some owners argue that 20-year equipment cannot be retrofitted at reasonable cost and that mandated replacement would cause its own outages. The evidence consists of cost estimates and the incident record rather than controlled comparison.
Does disclosure of industrial control vulnerabilities help defenders more than attackers?
Those favouring full public advisories argue that owners cannot prioritise what they do not know and that attackers already have the information; CISA's ICS advisories follow this approach. Those favouring restricted disclosure argue that exploitation of a disclosed OT vulnerability can take years to patch and that the physical consequences differ from IT. The evidence on exploitation timing in OT is thin.

Bodies and data

Bodies that set practice, and the data they publish

Bodies and standards are named so learners can find and apply their published work; the Academy teaches their use and links to the publisher, and no affiliation is implied.

BodyRole in the field
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) TC 65Maintains the IEC 62443 series on industrial automation and control system security, with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 for functional safety.
ISA (International Society of Automation)Co-develops the ISA/IEC 62443 standards and runs the related conformity assessment scheme for products and processes.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Publishes SP 800-82 Revision 3, the guide to operational technology security, and the Cybersecurity Framework profiles for manufacturing.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)Issues industrial control system advisories, the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, and coordinates vulnerability disclosure for control system vendors.
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and national NIS2 authoritiesGuidance for operators of essential services, sector-specific risk measures and incident reporting under the NIS2 Directive and the network code on cybersecurity for electricity.
Food and Drug Administration (United States) and the International Medical Device Regulators ForumSet premarket and postmarket cybersecurity expectations for medical devices, including software bills of materials in submissions.
DatasetSteward
ICS advisoriesCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
MITRE ATT&CK for ICSMITRE Corporation
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities CatalogCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
National Vulnerability Database (NVD)National Institute of Standards and Technology

04Mbinu

From a failure rate to a safety integrity level, and the attack the arithmetic cannot see

A safety instrumented function's probability of failure on demand follows from its dangerous failure rate and its proof-test interval, and maps to a safety integrity level; the calculation assumes random, independent faults, so the security level of the zone around the controller is a separate decision that the safety figure never covers.

Sources: Stouffer et al., Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3) (2023); Kriaa, Pietre-Cambacedes, Bouissou and Halgand, A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems (2015); Young and Leveson, An integrated approach to safety and security based on systems theory (2014).

05At a glance

At a glance, hub and courses

Grafu ya 3D

Kitivo cha Teknolojia na Mifumo ya Kidijitali

295 nodes1,814 relations9 views

Explore the 3D graph: Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems

06Dashibodi

How Operational technology and cyber-physical security is taught, as a process you can run

Press Play to run this process from this page's own data.

Teknolojia ya uendeshaji na usalama wa kimtandao-kimwili

How Operational technology and cyber-physical security is taught

5 subjects in scope, 3 key terms, courses in development, 1 lab, in the Cyber, Digital and Space Systems department of Technology and Digital Systems: from the scope to the method and its terms, the courses that teach it, the labs on the twin, the assessment and the record.

  1. 01 Scope

    1. 01

      Industrial control…

      Start · the discipline

      Industrial control systems and SCADA

    2. 02

      The IEC 62443 series

      Start · the discipline

      The IEC 62443 series

    3. 03

      Safety and security…

      Start · the discipline

      Safety and security co-engineering

    4. 04

      Attacks with physical…

      Start · the discipline

      Attacks with physical consequences

    5. 05

      Network segmentation…

      Start · the discipline

      Network segmentation and the Purdue model

  2. 02 Method and terms

    1. 06

      From a failure rate to…

      Model · the learner

      A safety instrumented function's probability of failure on demand follows from its dangerous failure rate and its proof-test interval, and…

    2. 07

      Operational technology

      Record · the discipline

      Hardware and software that monitor and control physical devices and processes.

    3. 09

      SCADA

      Record · the discipline

      Supervisory control and data acquisition: systems that monitor and control distributed industrial assets.

    4. 11

      Security level

      Record · the discipline

      In IEC 62443, a measure of the resistance of a zone or component to attackers of increasing capability.

  3. 04 Labs

    1. 08

      Pacha

      Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin

      The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.

  4. 05 Assess

    1. 10

      Module checks

      Gate · the course

      Each module ends with a short check against its outcomes.

    2. 12

      Assessed work

      Decision · the learner

      The assessed work that closes a course: a lab record, a case memo or an assignment, reviewed against the rubric.

  5. 06 Record

    1. 13

      Rekodi ya ukamilishaji

      Outcome · the learner

      The record stacks into the discipline achievement.

    2. 14

      Discipline achievement

      Record · the Academy

      The discipline achievement follows the discipline rule, read from the records.

Operational technology and cyber-physical security · Cyber, Digital and Space Systems An outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.

07Kujifunza

Achievements, where this is practised, practised in and across the ecosystem

Mafanikio

Achievements in this discipline

  1. Course achievements

    One for each course with this as its primary discipline, earned when you pass the course's assessed activities.

An achievement is a record of the learning completed and assessed here. How recognition works.

Where this is practised

Where the subject is practised

A field platform page on this subject is in development.

Practised in

The three Foundry systems where it is practised

Foundry system pages describe what each system and its rooms are designed to do; the courses teach the methods these systems apply.

Across the ecosystem

Across the ecosystem

The science, platforms and standards this discipline draws on and contributes to across the ecosystem.

Foundations in the STEM Commons

Pages of the ecosystem, cited so learners can follow the field into research, platforms, standards and national practice.

08Shiriki

Take part in Technology and Digital Systems

Anza na wewe ni nani.

Njia

  • Njia

    Taasisi za kitaifa

    Wizara, ofisi za takwimu na mashirika: dawati na tawi la kitaifa, na kiti katika vikundi kazi. Sura za kitaifa

  • Njia

    Sekta na taaluma

    Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches technology and digital systems. For organisations

  • Njia

    Kujifunza

    Kozi na mazoezi, pamoja na rekodi ya kila kozi iliyokamilishwa. Kusoma ni bure. Ujifunzaji huria

  • Njia

    Viwango

    Andaa rasimu, kagua na pitisha mbinu na viwango vya data pamoja na vikundi kazi. Vikundi kazi

  • Njia

    Jumuiya na utafiti

    Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the Academy

Miito wazi

Mwito waziInatafutaInafungwa
Mwito wa uanzishaji kwa wataalamu wa vikundi kazi CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTSmtaalamu, mhariri, mwenyekiti2026-12-15
Uteuzi wazi kwa viti vitatu vya wataalamu huru vya Baraza la Viwango la Dunia CALL-GSC-INDmjumbe wa baraza2026-12-01
Uteuzi wa wanachama wa kikanda wa muda (unatumika tu ikiwa kifungu cha mpito kitaamuliwa) CALL-GSC-REGmjumbe wa baraza2026-12-15
Ukaguzi wa miongozo ya kiini cha hatari ya wimbi la 1 (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1mchangiaji2027-01-31
Wataalamu wa viwango vya msingi vya sayansi ya hatari: kutokuwa na uhakika na upangaji wa ushahidi, vipimo, maamuzi ya wataalamu yaliyopangwa, ustahimilivu, matukio makali na ya mchanganyiko, hatari za maafa makubwa na za kuwepo, maadili na usawa, vipimo na upimaji (NRS-C17 hadi NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCEmtaalamu, mhariri, mwenyekiti2027-01-31
Wakaguzi huru wa familia za atlasi ya hatari, watatu kutoka angalau kanda mbili kwa kila familia (NHS2-R19), familia za kipaumbele kwanza CALL-ATLAS-REVIEWmtaalamu2027-03-31
Wajumbe wa Jopo la muda la Ukaguzi wa Usalama wa Mipaka Mipya na wakaguzi wa timu nyekundu (usalama wa kibiolojia na ulinzi wa kibiolojia, usalama na ulinzi wa AI, ulinzi wa miundombinu muhimu); maombi hushughulikiwa kwa usiri CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEWmtaalamu2026-11-30
Wataalamu wa ontolojia, metrolojia, uthibitishaji wa programu na tathmini ya ulinganifu kwa rejista ya mahitaji, uwakilishi wa mashine wa NHS-2, seti za majaribio ya ulinganifu na mpango wa tathmini ya ulinganifu CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGYmtaalamu, mhariri2027-01-31

Miito iliyopita tarehe ya kufungwa hufichwa kiotomatiki. Kila mwito, pendekezo na njia: maeneo na miito wazi.

Seli na CERT

  1. Kusanya seli

    Leta pamoja watu watatu hadi saba wenye ujuzi unaokamilishana: data, mazoezi ya uwandani, sera na mawasiliano.

  2. Isajili

    Write to the team with the cell's name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the Academy

  3. Chagua hati

    Chagua lengo moja: utafiti na ushahidi, data na ramani, ukaguzi wa viwango, au utayari wa jamii.

  4. Jifunzeni pamoja

    Fuata njia za pamoja za masomo katika Risk Academy, pamoja na mazoezi na rekodi ya kila kozi iliyokamilishwa. Hatari na ustahimilivu

  5. Ongoza na uripoti

    Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups

  • Bobea kama Timu ya Jamii ya Kukabili Dharura (CERT)

    A CERT prepares its neighbourhood for the hazards it faces. It builds a local hazard profile from this site's map. It trains in household and street preparedness. It learns first aid and light search through recognised local providers, and it runs drills. A CERT works alongside the local emergency services and follows their direction. It never replaces them and is not an emergency service.

Kielezo

What a national team or a local community can do on The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) today.

  • NXS-GRX

    Your country's profile

    Wasifu wazi wa hatari kwa nchi 195, pamoja na vyanzo na leseni kwa kila thamani. Fungua Faharasa

  • NXS-GRX

    Sahihisha au jibu

    Sahihisha thamani au jibu kwa niaba ya nchi yako. Mabadiliko yanarekodiwa pamoja na athari yake. Fungua Faharasa

  • NXS-GRX

    Toa data

    Toa seti ya data. Inaingia kupitia lango la leseni, ikiwa na utajo wako. Fungua Faharasa

  • NXS-GRX

    Tumia data wazi

    Tabaka, wasifu na vigae kupitia API wazi. Fungua Faharasa

09References

Core references and where to begin

Start with Stouffer, then Langner, then Humayed.

  1. Stouffer, K., Pease, M., Tang, C. et al., Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3) (2023). csrc.nist.gov
  2. Langner, R., Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon (2011). DOI
  3. Cárdenas, A. A., Amin, S., Lin, Z.-S. et al., Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response (2011). DOI
  4. Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F. and Luo, B., Cyber-Physical Systems Security: A Survey (2017). DOI
  5. Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M. and Halgand, Y., A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems (2015). DOI
  6. Young, W. and Leveson, N. G., An integrated approach to safety and security based on systems theory (2014). DOI
  7. Williams, T. J., The Purdue enterprise reference architecture (1994). DOI
  8. Slay, J. and Miller, M., Lessons Learned from the Maroochy Water Breach (2008). DOI
  9. Leveson, N. G., Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied to Safety (2011). DOI

10Maswali

Maswali, majibu na istilahi muhimu

Je, kusoma hapa ni bure?

Ndiyo. Kila kozi na nyenzo ya kujifunzia ya Risk Academy, inayoongozwa na Nexus Consortium, ni bure kusoma, kwa kasi yako mwenyewe au pamoja na kundi. Ushiriki wa kawaida hauna ada. Kazi inayolipwa, mafunzo kazini na ushirika wa kitaaluma ni mipango tofauti.

Kukamilisha kozi kunanipa nini?

Rekodi ya ukamilishaji: kozi, toleo lake, tarehe na kilichotathminiwa. Ni ya faragha kwa chaguo-msingi na huishiriki wewe mwenyewe. Hujumlishwa kuwa mafanikio ya taaluma, idara na programu. Rekodi inaeleza kilichosomwa na kutathminiwa na haithibitishi umahiri; si leseni, cheo cha kitaaluma wala hali ya ajira.

Data na maeneo yanatoka wapi?

Kila kitivo hufundisha kwa kutumia pacha wa mahali halisi uliojengwa kwa data huria. Kila tabaka lina mtoa data, leseni na tarehe yake, na kila matokeo ya Academy yanataja chanzo chake. Ramani na takwimu ni viashiria vya kufundishia, si tathmini ya mahali popote.

How do I take part beyond the courses in operational technology and cyber-physical security?

Unda seli ya umahiri ya watu watatu hadi saba, soma njia ya pamoja, chukua kazi inayosimamiwa katika Vikundi Kazi vya Kitaifa, au leta kundi la wanafunzi kutoka taasisi yako. Kwa mashirika.

Istilahi kuu

Operational technology
Hardware and software that monitor and control physical devices and processes.
SCADA
Supervisory control and data acquisition: systems that monitor and control distributed industrial assets.
Security level
In IEC 62443, a measure of the resistance of a zone or component to attackers of increasing capability.
Zones and conduits
The IEC 62443 approach of grouping assets with common security needs and controlling communication between them.

RipotiChangia

Changia ushahidi kutoka ukurasa huu.

Reports ni chapisho la robo mwaka la Muungano. Unachojua kuhusu mada hii kinaweza kuwa ushahidi, mfano au marekebisho katika toleo lijalo, kikitajwa kwa jina lako na kuchapishwa chini ya CC BY 4.0 pale kinapokuwa kazi yako mwenyewe.

Risk Academy

Usitume kamwe data binafsi, maelezo nyeti ya miundombinu wala chochote ambacho huna haki ya kukishiriki. Mchango hupitiwa kabla ya kutumika; kuutuma hakutoi haki za uandishi wala za uhariri, na udhamini haununui matokeo.

Teknolojia ya uendeshaji na usalama wa kimtandao-kimwili

Prepare with a related course

Open courses in connected disciplines teach the methods this discipline will build on.

Vinjari orodha ya koziBack to Department of Cyber, Digital and Space Systems