Risk Academy, led by the Nexus Consortium · Systems and Nexus Studies · Department of Systemic Risk and Complexity
How a local disruption becomes a global shortage
Voorsieningsnetwerk en ekonomiese besmetting
A factory fire, a canal blockage or an export restriction can stop production on other continents, because modern economies run on long and concentrated supply networks.
Map supply network and economic contagion on a real placeSee the courses
Illustrative: plants and ports, the routes between them and goods moving along; one node is disrupted and its routes stall
01Omvang
What the discipline covers
The subtopics its courses and labs teach.
- Kursusse
- In preparation
- Vlakke
- In development
- Laboratoriums
- In development
- Input-output models and the inoperability model
- Production network structure and concentration
- Higher-tier supplier dependencies
- Inventories, buffers and bullwhip effects
- Agent-based models of supply chains
- Network robustness, percolation and chokepoints
- Trade and financial contagion
- Firm-level network data and its gaps
- Disruption scenarios and stress tests
02Kaarte
Build a twin of any place
Search any place or open the world; the layers and generators follow supply network and economic contagion on the planet map, the globe and in 3D.
- Terrain 0 to 1,700 m
- River 2,956 km
- 14 dams
- 6 power plants, 88 MW
- Tree cover 37.8 percent of the box
- Cropland 39.9 percent of the box
- Built-up 0.9 percent of the box
- Permanent water 4.7 percent of the box
- River discharge, GloFAS via Open-Meteo: read live when the 3D twin opens
- Vegetation index, MODIS Terra NDVI 8-day: read live when the 3D twin opens
- Surface water extent, OPERA DSWx (HLS): the flood pulse: read live when the 3D twin opens
- Land cover classes, MODIS IGBP (annual): read live when the 3D twin opens
Drag to move, right drag or Shift with a drag to turn and tilt, Ctrl with the wheel to zoom. Keyboard: arrows move, Shift with arrows turn and tilt, + and – zoom, 0 resets, V steps through the views, Escape clears.
Flat plan of the same data: the lake and rivers, the dams, the plants by capacity, the cropland and tree cover cells and the numbers below. The 3D twin opens on devices that can draw it, once its data and code have been checked; discharge, vegetation, surface water and the annual land cover load in the twin on request, each with its data date.
The boundaries, names and designations shown do not imply any judgement on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Countries: Natural Earth (public domain).
03The subject
The subject, methods and measures and debates and bodies
The discipline
The field and its scope
For supply-chain, trade and financial-stability analysts who need to trace how a local disruption becomes a system-wide loss and to judge the models and data behind such estimates.
Supply network and economic contagion is the study of how shocks move through production, trade and financial networks. A flood at one plant, a port closure, a sanctions decision or a bank failure propagates along input-output links, supplier relationships, inventories and credit exposures, and the structure of the network decides whether it fades or amplifies. The field joins input-output economics, network science, operations management and financial-stability research, and serves firms, central banks, trade ministries and insurers who must estimate indirect losses and find the chokepoints that matter.
The field is organised by the layer of data available. Sector-level input-output tables support models of inoperability and of regional and global loss propagation. Firm-level transaction and ownership data, where accessible, support reconstruction of actual supply networks and the identification of systemically important firms. Trade data and shipping records support chokepoint analysis. Financial exposures support contagion models such as DebtRank. Each layer carries its own gaps, and the most consequential links, those to second- and third-tier suppliers, are the least observed.
Measures
Quantities and units
| Quantity | Unit or scale | What to know |
|---|---|---|
| Inoperability | fraction of a sector's normal output lost (0 to 1) | The headline output of the inoperability input-output model, propagated through the Leontief inverse from an initial perturbation. It assumes fixed technical coefficients and no substitution, so it is an upper bound on short-run propagation rather than a forecast. |
| Economic systemic risk index of a firm | fraction of national output lost if the firm fails (0 to 1) | Computed from firm-level supply networks by removing the firm and iterating production constraints. In the one national network studied in full, a small number of firms carried most of the systemic risk; the index depends on the substitution rules and on the completeness of the transaction data. |
| Supplier concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index) | dimensionless (0 to 1, or 0 to 10,000) | The concentration of an input among suppliers, countries or ports. It flags chokepoints but says nothing about the time to substitute, which is the quantity that determines loss. |
| Time to recover and time to survive | days or weeks | The time a node needs to restore supply after a disruption, and the time its customers can continue from inventory and alternatives. A node is critical when its time to recover exceeds its customers' time to survive; both are reported as ranges from firm data and interviews. |
| Bullwhip ratio | ratio of order variance to demand variance (dimensionless) | Measures the amplification of demand variability up a chain. It exceeds one in most observed chains and grows with forecast updating, order batching and lead time; the ratio is estimated from order and sales records and is sensitive to the aggregation period. |
Metodes
Methods and their limits
Each method is listed with what it assumes and where it fails.
| Metode | Assumes | Fails when |
|---|---|---|
| Inoperability input-output model (Haimes and Jiang) | Sectors use inputs in fixed proportions given by an input-output table, and the loss of output in one sector reduces output in dependent sectors proportionally, with no substitution or inventory. | Over horizons longer than weeks, substitution, rationing and rebuilding change the coefficients; sector aggregation hides the single supplier that matters; and the model cannot represent capacity constraints or price adjustment. |
| Adaptive regional input-output and dynamic loss models | Production, inventories, rationing and reconstruction can be simulated over time at sector or regional resolution with explicit behavioural rules. | The rules for rationing and substitution drive the results and are rarely validated; regional tables are often estimated rather than surveyed; and the models are sensitive to the recovery schedule assumed. |
| Firm-level supply-network simulation | A network of supplier-customer links at firm level is observed or reconstructed, and production can be simulated by propagating shortfalls along it under stated substitution rules. | Comprehensive firm-level data exist for few countries and are confidential; reconstructed networks from partial data mis-estimate concentration; and foreign tiers are usually missing. |
| Network percolation and chokepoint analysis | Removing nodes or edges from a trade, shipping or production graph and measuring the surviving flow identifies the elements whose loss fragments the system. | Flows reroute in reality, and the graph lacks the capacity and cost information that decides whether rerouting is possible; the result is a structural ranking, not a loss estimate. |
| Financial contagion models (DebtRank and counterparty networks) | Interbank and counterparty exposures are known and losses propagate through them in proportion to exposure and leverage, before any fire sale or funding run. | Exposure data are incomplete across borders and off balance sheet; fire sales and liquidity hoarding, which drove observed crises, require additional mechanisms; and the results change with the assumed loss-given-default. |
| Econometric identification from natural experiments | An exogenous shock to identifiable suppliers, such as an earthquake, lets the effect on customers and their customers be estimated against unaffected firms. | Each event identifies propagation in one setting and horizon; the estimates may not transfer to other shocks or to firms that have since changed their sourcing. |
Debates
What the field debates
- Do idiosyncratic shocks to firms matter for aggregate output?
- Network theory following Acemoglu and colleagues (2012) shows that in a production economy with a fat-tailed degree distribution, firm-level shocks do not average out and can drive aggregate fluctuations; evidence from the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake supports sizeable propagation to indirect customers. The sceptical position holds that over months substitution and inventories absorb most shocks and that observed propagation is largest for specific inputs; the disagreement is about horizon and input specificity rather than about the mechanism.
- Resilience through redundancy or through efficiency?
- After the disruptions of 2020 to 2022, one position argues for buffers, dual sourcing and regionalisation, citing the losses traced to single-source and single-region dependencies. The other argues that lean, concentrated networks recovered faster than expected, that redundancy has a permanent cost borne in every year without a shock, and that visibility into lower tiers achieves more per unit cost than inventory. Firm-level evidence on recovery times is used by both sides.
- Can firm-level supply networks be reconstructed well enough to regulate on?
- Studies using national value-added-tax transaction data show that systemically important firms can be identified and that the ranking is stable to modest data errors, which supports a supervisory use. Critics note that such data exist in few jurisdictions, omit cross-border links and services, and that publishing a firm's systemic index could itself change behaviour and markets. Reconstruction from partial data remains an open methodological problem.
Bodies and data
Bodies that set practice, and the data they publish
Bodies and standards are named so learners can find and apply their published work; the Academy teaches their use and links to the publisher, and no affiliation is implied.
| Body | Role in the field |
|---|---|
| Complexity Science Hub Vienna | Develops methods for firm-level supply-network reconstruction and systemic-risk indices from national transaction data, including studies of the national production network of Hungary. |
| Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) | Publishes the Inter-Country Input-Output tables and analyses of global value chains used in propagation and dependency studies. |
| Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Board | Set the macroprudential framing and the data standards for financial contagion analysis, including global systemically important bank assessment. |
| World Trade Organization and UN Comtrade | Steward the trade statistics on which concentration and chokepoint analyses rest. |
| Groningen Growth and Development Centre | Built and maintains the World Input-Output Database, an open multi-regional input-output resource widely used in academic propagation studies. |
| Dataset | Steward |
|---|---|
| World Input-Output Database (WIOD) | Groningen Growth and Development Centre |
| Eora global multi-regional input-output tables | KGM & Associates |
| UN Comtrade | United Nations Statistics Division |
| OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables | OECD |
04Die metode
One supplier down: how inoperability travels through a production network and what inventory buys
A supplier that stops delivering makes its customers inoperable in proportion to how much of their input it supplied; the loss multiplies through the input-output structure, and the days of inventory on hand decide whether the shock passes through or dies out before the supplier recovers.
Sources: Haimes and Jiang, Leontief-based model of risk in complex interconnected infrastructures (2001); Hallegatte, An adaptive regional input-output model and its application to the assessment of the economic cost of Katrina (2008); Carvalho, Nirei, Saito and Tahbaz-Salehi, Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan earthquake (2021); Inoue and Todo, Firm-level propagation of shocks through supply-chain networks (2019).
05At a glance
At a glance, hub and courses
- Build a twin of any placeTwin builderWorked example: the Tonle Sap and the Lower Mekong at Phnom Penh · 5 generators · 13 layers · 2 instruments
3D-grafiek
Fakulteit vir Stelsel- en Nexus-studies
211 nodes1,557 relations9 views
06Konsole
How Supply network and economic contagion is taught, as a process you can run
Press Play to run this process from this page’s own data.
Voorsieningsnetwerk en ekonomiese besmetting
How Supply network and economic contagion is taught
5 subjects in scope, 3 key terms, courses in development, 1 lab, in the Systemic Risk and Complexity department of Systems and Nexus Studies: from the scope to the method and its terms, the courses that teach it, the labs on the twin, the assessment and the record.
-
01 Scope
- 01
Input-output models and the inoperability model
Start · the discipline
Input-output models and the inoperability model
- 02
Production network structure and concentration
Start · the discipline
Production network structure and concentration
- 03
Higher-tier supplier dependencies
Start · the discipline
Higher-tier supplier dependencies
- 04
Inventories, buffers and bullwhip effects
Start · the discipline
Inventories, buffers and bullwhip effects
- 05
Agent-based models of supply chains
Start · the discipline
Agent-based models of supply chains
- 01
-
02 Method and terms
- 06
One supplier down: how inoperability travels through
Model · the learner
A supplier that stops delivering makes its customers inoperable in proportion to how much of their input it supplied.
- 07
Input-output model
Record · the discipline
A model of the flows of goods and services between sectors used to trace how output in one sector depends on others.
- 09
Inoperability
Record · the discipline
The proportion by which a sector's output falls short of its planned level after a disruption.
- 11
Chokepoint
Record · the discipline
A node or route in a network whose loss cuts off a large share of flows.
- 06
-
04 Labs
- 08
Tweeling
Exercise · the learner, on the faculty twin
The method runs on the faculty twin and the admitted map layers.
- 08
-
05 Assess
- 10
Module checks
Gate · the course
Each module ends with a short check against its outcomes.
- 12
Assessed work
Decision · the learner
The assessed work that closes a course: a lab record, a case memo or an assignment, reviewed against the rubric.
- 10
-
06 Record
- 13
Voltooiingsrekord
Outcome · the learner
The record stacks into the discipline achievement.
- 14
Discipline achievement
Record · the Academy
The discipline achievement follows the discipline rule, read from the records.
- 13
Supply network and economic contagion · Systemic Risk and Complexity An outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.
07Leer
Achievements, where this is practised, practised in and across the ecosystem
Prestasies
Achievements in this discipline
Course achievements
One for each course with this as its primary discipline, earned when you pass the course’s assessed activities.
Department: Systemic Risk and Complexity
Earn two discipline achievements in the Department of Systemic Risk and Complexity. In development.
An achievement is a record of the learning completed and assessed here. How recognition works.
Where this is practised
Where the subject is practised
A field platform page on this subject is in development.
Practised in
The two Foundry systems where it is practised
- FoundryNXS-GRX systemShocks propagate through production and trade networks
- NXS-NET systemNetwork topology sets how disruptions spread
Foundry system pages describe what each system and its rooms are designed to do; the courses teach the methods these systems apply.
Across the ecosystem
Across the ecosystem
The science, platforms and standards this discipline draws on and contributes to across the ecosystem.
Foundations in the STEM Commons
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Network science and contagionNetwork science and contagion study how the structure of connections among entities shapes the spread of failures, information and disease.
- Optimisation and operations researchOptimisation and operations research develop mathematical methods for allocating resources and making decisions under constraints.
- Economics and development economicsEconomics and development economics study how societies produce, distribute and consume resources and how living standards change.
Pages of the ecosystem, cited so learners can follow the field into research, platforms, standards and national practice.
08Neem deel
Take part in Systems and Nexus Studies
Begin by wie u is.
Roetes
Roete
Nasionale instellings
Ministeries, statistiekkantore en agentskappe: 'n nasionale lessenaar en tak, en 'n setel in die werkgroepe. Nasionale hoofstukke
Roete
Sektore en beroepe
Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches systems and nexus studies. For organisations
Roete
Leer
Kursusse en praktyk, met 'n rekord van elke voltooide kursus. Gratis om te studeer. Oop leer
Roete
Standaarde
Stel die metodes en datastandaarde saam met die werkgroepe op, hersien en aanvaar dit. Werkgroepe
Roete
Gemeenskappe en navorsing
Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the Academy
Oop oproepe
| Oop oproep | Soek | Sluit |
|---|---|---|
| Stigtingsoproep vir kundiges vir die werkgroepe CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTS | kundige, redakteur, voorsitter | 2026-12-15 |
| Oop nominasie vir die drie onafhanklike kundigesetels van die Wêreldwye Standaarderaad CALL-GSC-IND | raadslid | 2026-12-01 |
| Nominasies van tussentydse streekslede (geld slegs as daar oor die oorgangsbepaling besluit word) CALL-GSC-REG | raadslid | 2026-12-15 |
| Hersiening van die uiteensettings van die golf-1-risikokern (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1 | bydraer | 2027-01-31 |
| Kundiges vir die kernstandaarde van risikowetenskap: onsekerheid en gradering van bewyse, skale, gestruktureerde kundige oordeel, aanvaarbaarheid, uiterstes en saamgestelde gebeure, katastrofiese en eksistensiële risiko, etiek en billikheid, eenhede en meting (NRS-C17 tot NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCE | kundige, redakteur, voorsitter | 2027-01-31 |
| Onafhanklike beoordelaars vir die families van die gevaar-atlas, drie uit minstens twee streke vir elke familie (NHS2-R19), prioriteitsfamilies eerste CALL-ATLAS-REVIEW | kundige | 2027-03-31 |
| Lede van die tussentydse Frontier Safety Review Panel en rooispanbeoordelaars (biologiese veiligheid en biosekuriteit, KI-veiligheid en -sekuriteit, sekuriteit van kritieke infrastruktuur); aansoeke word vertroulik hanteer CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEW | kundige | 2026-11-30 |
| Kundiges in ontologie, metrologie, sagtewareverifikasie en konformiteitsbeoordeling vir die vereisteregister, die NHS-2-masjienvoorstelling, die konformiteitstoetsreekse en die konformiteitsbeoordelingskema CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGY | kundige, redakteur | 2027-01-31 |
Oproepe ná hul sluitingsdatum word outomaties versteek. Elke oproep, voorstel en roete: oop gebiede en oproepe.
Selle en CERT's
Bring die sel bymekaar
Bring drie tot sewe mense met aanvullende vaardighede bymekaar: data, veldpraktyk, beleid en kommunikasie.
Registreer dit
Write to the team with the cell's name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the Academy
Kies 'n handves
Kies een fokus: navorsing en bewyse, data en kaarte, hersiening van standaarde, of gemeenskapsgereedheid.
Leer saam
Volg gedeelde studiepaaie by Risk Academy, met praktyk en 'n rekord van elke voltooide kursus. Gevare en veerkragtigheid
Lei en rapporteer
Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups
Spesialiseer as 'n Gemeenskapsnoodreaksiespan (CERT)
A CERT prepares its neighbourhood for the hazards it faces. It builds a local hazard profile from this site's map. It trains in household and street preparedness. It learns first aid and light search through recognised local providers, and it runs drills. A CERT works alongside the local emergency services and follows their direction. It never replaces them and is not an emergency service.
Die Indeks
Wat 'n nasionale span of 'n plaaslike gemeenskap vandag op The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) kan doen.
NXS-GRX
Your country's profile
Oop risikoprofiele vir 195 lande, met bronne en lisensies by elke waarde. Open die Indeks
NXS-GRX
Korrigeer of antwoord
Korrigeer 'n waarde of antwoord namens jou land. Die verandering word met sy effek aangeteken. Open die Indeks
NXS-GRX
Bied data aan
Bied 'n datastel aan. Dit kom deur die lisensiehek in, met erkenning aan jou. Open die Indeks
NXS-GRX
Gebruik die oop data
Lae, profiele en teëls deur die oop API. Open die Indeks
09References
Core references and where to begin
Start with Acemoglu, then Haimes, then Hallegatte.
- Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V. M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations (2012). DOI
- Haimes, Y. Y. and Jiang, P., Leontief-based model of risk in complex interconnected infrastructures (2001). DOI
- Hallegatte, S., An adaptive regional input-output model and its application to the assessment of the economic cost of Katrina (2008). DOI
- Inoue, H. and Todo, Y., Firm-level propagation of shocks through supply-chain networks (2019). DOI
- Carvalho, V. M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y. U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan earthquake (2021). DOI
- Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks (2016). DOI
- Diem, C., Borsos, A., Reisch, T., Kertész, J. and Thurner, S., Quantifying firm-level economic systemic risk from nation-wide supply networks (2022). DOI
- Lee, H. L., Padmanabhan, V. and Whang, S., Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect (1997). DOI
- Haldane, A. G. and May, R. M., Systemic risk in banking ecosystems (2011). DOI
- Battiston, S., Puliga, M., Kaushik, R., Tasca, P. and Caldarelli, G., DebtRank: too central to fail? Financial networks, the FED and systemic risk (2012). DOI
- Guan, D. et al., Global supply-chain effects of COVID-19 control measures (2020). DOI
- Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J., An illustrated user guide to the World Input-Output Database: the case of global automotive production (2015). DOI
10Vrae
Vrae, antwoorde en kernterme
Is studie hier gratis?
Ja. Elke kursus en leermateriaal van Risk Academy, gelei deur die Nexus Consortium, is gratis om te studeer, op eie tempo of saam met 'n groep. Gewone deelname het geen fooi nie; betaalde werk, internskappe en genootskappe is afsonderlike reëlings.
Wat gee die voltooiing van 'n kursus my?
'n Voltooiingsrekord: die kursus, sy weergawe, die datum en wat geassesseer is, by verstek privaat en deur u gedeel. Dit stapel op tot dissipline-, departements- en programprestasies. 'n Rekord meld wat bestudeer en geassesseer is en sertifiseer nie bevoegdheid nie; dit is nie 'n lisensie, 'n professionele titel of 'n indiensnemingstatus nie.
Waar kom die data en die plekke vandaan?
Elke fakulteit onderrig op 'n tweeling van 'n werklike plek wat uit oop data gebou is; elke laag dra sy verskaffer, lisensie en datum, en elke resultaat op die Akademie vermeld sy bron. Kaarte en figure is aanwysers vir onderrig, nooit 'n assessering van 'n plek nie.
How do I take part beyond the courses in supply network and economic contagion?
Vorm 'n bevoegdheidsel van drie tot sewe mense, bestudeer 'n gedeelde roete, neem 'n opdrag onder toesig in die Nasionale Werkgroepe, of bring 'n groep van jou instelling. Vir organisasies.
Kernterme
- Input-output model
- A model of the flows of goods and services between sectors used to trace how output in one sector depends on others.
- Inoperability
- The proportion by which a sector’s output falls short of its planned level after a disruption.
- Chokepoint
- A node or route in a network whose loss cuts off a large share of flows.
- Percolation
- The process by which a network fragments as nodes or links are removed, used to measure robustness.
VerslaeDra by
Dra bewyse vanaf hierdie bladsy by.
Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Risk Academy
- EmailGateway GW-ACADEMY Send it from this page Evidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen deposit Deposit it and submit to the community Publish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsRisk Academy See every way to contribute The contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Stuur nooit persoonlike data, sensitiewe infrastruktuurbesonderhede of enigiets wat u geen reg het om te deel nie. 'n Bydrae word voor gebruik beoordeel; die stuur daarvan verleen geen outeurskap of redaksionele regte nie, en borgskap koop nooit 'n bevinding nie.
Voorsieningsnetwerk en ekonomiese besmetting
Prepare with a related course
Open courses in connected disciplines teach the methods this discipline will build on.
Blaai deur die kursuskatalogusBack to Department of Systemic Risk and Complexity